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‘The most important thing to say [about the law of remedies] is that there is no law of
remedies’1
I. Introduction
Competition law remedies have recently become the focus of academic scholars with a
number of publications dedicated on this topic in the United States (US)2 and in the European
Union (EU)3. The Microsoft litigation was the catalyst of this evolution, as designing
adequate remedies constituted one of the most controversial aspects of the case in Europe and
1 Wright, C.A. (1955) ‘The Law of Remedies as a Social Institution’ U Detroit L Rev 18, 376.
2 See, the extensive bibliography by Fox, E. & Paul Sirkis. (2005) ‘Antitrust Remedies - Selected Bibliography
and Annotations’ American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 06-01. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1103601,
accessed October 15th, 2012; Barnett, T.O. (2009) ‘Section 2: Remedies: What to do after Catching the Tiger by
the Tail’ The Antitrust Law Journal 76(1), 31-41; Cavanagh, E. (2005) ‘Antitrust Remedies Revisited’ The
Oregon Law Review 84 147-226; Weber-Waller, S. (2008) ‘Remedies for Monopolization and Abuse of
Dominance: A Little History and Some Thoughts on Disclosure and Access’
http://www.biicl.org/files/3412_antitrust_marathon_(weber_weller).pdf , accessed October 15th 2012.
3 See, Hellström, F. Maier-Rigaud & D. Wenzel Bulst (2009), ‘Remedies in European Antitrust Law’, The
Antitrust Law Journal, 76(1), 43-63; Lianos I. (2012), ‘Competition Law Remedies: in Search of a Theory’ in
Lianos I. and D. Sokol (eds), The Global Limits of Competition Law, Stanford: Stanford University Press, pp.
177-204; Sullivan E.T. (2003), ‘Antitrust Remedies in the E.U. and U.S.: Advancing a Standard of
Proportionality, 48(2) The Antitrust Bulletin 377-425.
4the US4. Commitment decisions in the EU have also generated a lot of debate on the
proportionality of remedial action, in view of the differing standards of judicial scrutiny to
which these are subject to, in comparison to infringement decisions5. Finally, it is clear that
the topic presents important empirical and theoretical challenges. First, it requires an analysis
of the practice of the European Commission, as remedies for the same statutory violation may
vary considerably. Second, the EU includes both common law and civil law jurisdictions, and
the concept of ‘remedies’ has not necessarily being theorized as a distinct topic (from that of
substantive law) to the same extent in each of these broad legal families, but also within the
civil law family, as the French and the German legal tradition can instruct us. Thirdly, public
lawyers may take a different perspective on remedies than private lawyers as they may
emphasize different type of limits to remedial discretion.
Of course, competition law remedies have long been a well-examined topic in merger
control, as both the US and the EU have published discussion papers and guidelines
providing information on their practices and explaining how different types of remedies
interact with each other in this area.6 However, no such effort of systematization has been
made until recently in the area of antitrust law and few studies have examined the possibility
of a unifying model, applicable to all kinds of competition law ‘wrongs’ (anti-competitive
mergers or antitrust infringements).
The study proceeds as following. We will first examine the ‘received view’ of the
taxonomy of competition law remedies and describe their legal framework in both EU
antitrust and merger control. We will then take a critical perspective on the existing typology,
which to our view is intellectually sterile, and will integrate the topic of competition law
remedies in the broader theoretical framework of remedies in the private and public law
traditions. The fit between the remedy and the competition law wrong it aims to redress and,
4 See, Rubini L. (eds) (2010), Microsoft on Trial: Legal and Economic Analysis of a Transatlantic Antitrust
Case, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Economides, N. and I. Lianos (2010) ‘A Critical Appraisal of Remedies in
the EU Antitrust Microsoft Cases’, Columbia Business Law Review 2010 (2) 346-420.
5 See, Pera A. and M. Carpagnano (2008) ‘The law and practice of commitment decisions : a comparative
analysis’ European Competition Law Review 29(12) 669-685 ; Schweitzer. H. (2012) ‘Commitment
decisions : an overview of EU and national case law’ eCompetition Bulletin,
http://www.concurrences.com/english/bulletin/special-issues/commitments-decisions/ accessed October 15th,
2012; Temple Lang, J. (2006) ‘Commitment decisions and settlements with antitrust authorities and private
parties under European antitrust law ‘ in Annual proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute 2005
(2006), v. 32, Transnational Juris: The Hague, pp. 265-324 ; Waelbroeck, D. (2009) ‘The Development of a
New 'Settlement Culture' in Competition Cases What is Left to the Courts?’, in Gheur C. & N. Petit (eds)
Alternative enforcement techniques in EC competition law, Brussels: Bruylant, 220-260; Wagner von Papp, F.
(2012) ‘Best and Even Better Practices in the European Commitment Procedure after Alrosa: The Dangers of
Abandoning the Struggle for Competition Law’ Common Market Law Review 49(3) 929-970; Wils, W.P.J.
(2008) ‘The use of settlements in public antitrust enforcement : objectives and principles’ World Competition
31(3) 335-352.
6 See, ICN Merger Working Group: Analytical Framework Subgroup 92005), Merger Remedies Review Project
, http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc323.pdf, accessed October 15th 2012;
Wang W. and M. Rudanko (2012) ‘EU merger remedies and competition concerns : an empirical assessment’
European Law Journal 18(4) 555-576 ; Davies S. and B. Lyons (2007), Merger and Merger Remedies in the
EU, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.
5more generally, the question of the remedial discretion of the Commission and national
competition authorities in EU competition law enforcement will offer a common narrative
that would exemplify the specificities of the public and private law accounts of the concept of
remedy. We will explore next the dichotomy between voluntary and coercive remedies,
recently introduced by the case law of the European Courts in order to increase the remedial
discretion of the Commission. The final part will conclude.
II. Concept, legal framework, taxonomy
A. The emergence of the concept
The concept of ‘remedies’ is a recent addition to EU competition law jargon. The EU courts
employed the concept for the first time in the Microsoft case, the General Court observing
that
‘(w)here remedies are provided for in the decision, the undertaking concerned is
required to implement them – and to assume all the costs associated with their
implementation –, failing which it exposes itself to liability for periodic penalty
payments imposed pursuant to Article 16 of Regulation No 17’7.
In the same judgment, the Court noted that the remedial power of the Commission is subject
to the principle of proportionality:
‘The case-law shows […] that the Commission does not have unlimited discretion
when formulating remedies to be imposed on undertakings for the purpose of putting
an end to an infringement. In the context of the application of Article 3 of Regulation
No 17 [now replaced by Regulation 1/2003], the principle of proportionality requires
that the burdens imposed on undertakings in order to bring an infringement to an end
do not exceed what is appropriate and necessary to attain the objective sought, namely
re-establishment of compliance with the rules infringed’8.
There is no occurrence of the concept of ‘remedies’ in the older case law of the EU
Courts. This might be explained by the fact that Regulation 17/62 on the implementation of
what are now Articles 101 and 102 TFEU did not employ the word remedy, article 3 of
Regulation 17 simply noting that when the Commission finds the existence of an
infringement of these provisions, it may require by decision the undertakings concerned ‘to
7 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v. Commission , [2007] ECR II-3601, para. 1256.
8 Ibid., para. 1276.
6bring such infringement to an end’. The concept of remedy was indeed unknown as such to
the Continental civil law systems that formed the European Communities at the time. The
concept was still under-developed in English law, as the first efforts of rationalization and
classification of remedies date from the 1970s9. The case law of the EU Courts, prior to
Microsoft, employed the expression ‘bringing an infringement to an end’ of Article 3 Reg.
17/62 for both declarations of incompatibility of a specific practice to EU competition law
and for positive or negative duties imposed to the undertakings having infringed these
provisions.
In Commercial Solvents, Advocate General (hereinafter AG) Warner noted that ‘the
reason why Article 3 (1) was left in general terms was that infringements of Articles [101]
and [102] can take so many forms that it would have been impossible for the authors of the
(R)egulation to provide a catalogue of the measures capable of being ordered by the
Commission in order to bring such infringements to an end’10. The AG accepted the practice
of the Commission in this case to accompany its finding of an infringement of Article [102
TFEU] by the Commercial Solvents group with a positive obligation imposed to the
dominant undertaking to supply within a given time a given quantity of a given product at a
maximum price to its competitor, Zoya. Although, Article 3 of Regulation 17/62 did not
explicitly recognize the possibility for the Commission to impose an injunction, for the AG a
‘cease and desist’ order would be pointless if this were not followed by a ‘specific
recommendation’. AG Warner suggested nevertheless the annulment of the Commission’s
decision as the latter had imposed on the dominant undertaking duties that went beyond the
scope of its infringement of Article 102 TFEU11.
The Court of Justice of the EU (hereinafter CJEU) agreed with the AG on the broad
interpretation of the expression ‘bringing the infringement to an end’, noting the following:
‘this provision must be applied in relation to the infringement which has been
established and may include an order to do certain acts or provide certain advantages
which have been wrongfully withheld as well as prohibiting the continuation of
certain action, practices or situations which are contrary to the Treaty. For this
purpose the Commission may, if necessary, require the undertaking concerned to
submit to it proposals with a view to bringing the situation into conformity with the
requirements of the Treaty.
9 See, Lawson, F.H. (1972), Remedies of English Law, London:Penguin Books.
10 Opinion AG Warner, in Case 6-7/73, Instituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents
Corporation v E.C. Commission , [1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309, pp. 331-335.
11 The Commission could order the dominant company to resume supplies to Zoya only in so far as the cessation
of such supplies might affect trade between Member-States, a constitutive element of the prohibition of an abuse
of dominant position. However, according to the AG, the obligation imposed by the Commission to the
Commercial Solvents groups did not make the distinction between the actual sales of Zoja destined for the
Common Market and those destined for third countries, for which there would not be any effect on trade
(according to the definition of this concept at the time).
7In the present case, having established a refusal to sell incompatible with Article [102
TFEU], the Commission was entitled to order certain quantities of raw material to be
supplied to make good the refusal of supplies as well as to order that proposals to
prevent a repetition of the conduct complained of be put forward. In order to ensure
that its decision was effective the Commission was entitled to determine the minimum
requirements to ensure that the infringement was made good and that Zoja was
protected from the consequences of it. In choosing as a guide to the needs of Zoja the
quantity of previous supplies the Commission has not exceeded its discretionary
power’12.
However, the CJEU rejected the narrow view of its AG on the scope of the specific
duty imposed to the Commercial Solvents group. Indeed, since the aim of the conduct
complained of was to eliminate one of the principal competitors of the Commercial Solvents
group within the Common Market, ‘it was above all necessary to prevent such an
infringement of Community competition by adequate measures’13. Hence the scope of the
duty imposed on Commercial Solvents was at ‘the root of the litigation’ as it ensured that
Zoya would not be excluded from the market.
The case illustrates that the concept of remedies may encompass not only measures
that redress but also measures that prevent competition law infringements. According to a
well-established case law, the Commission must be able to exercise the right to take decisions
conferred upon it ‘in the most efficacious manner best suited to the circumstances of each
given situation’14, this implying for the Commission a ‘right to order such undertakings to
take or refrain from taking certain action with a view to bringing the infringement to an
end’15. However, as it has also been noted by the EU Courts, the obligations imposed on the
dominant undertaking should be justified in ‘light of the purpose’ of bringing the
infringement to an end16.
For example, in Magill, the requirement imposed on the dominant undertakings to
supply on request and on a no-discriminatory basis their weekly listings with a view to their
publication in a comprehensive TV guide, was found, in view of the constitutive elements of
the infringement, to be ‘the only means of bringing that infringement to an end’17. Referring
to remedies as ‘burdens imposed on undertakings in order to bring an infringement of
12 Case 6-7/73, Istituto Chemioterapico Italiano SpA and Commercial Solvents Corporation v E.C. Commission,
[1974] 1 C.M.L.R. 309, para. 45-46.
13 Ibid., para. 49.
14 Case 792/79R, Order of the Court, Camera Care Ltd v. Commission [1980] ECR 119, para. 17 (providing the
possibility for the Commission to adopt interim measures).
15 Case T-,76/89, Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission, [1991] ECR II-575, para. 70,
16 Ibid.
17 Ibid. Emphasis added.
8competition law to an end’, the CJEU confirmed the position of the General Court and noted
that these ‘must not exceed what is appropriate and necessary to attain the objective sought,
namely re-establishment of compliance with the rules infringed’18.
In contrast to the few instances in which the concept of ‘remedy’ was employed by
the EU Courts, the concept has featured in many decisions of the Commission in the context
of EU merger control19 and the implementation of Articles 10120 and 102 TFEU21. The
Commission was the first competition law jurisdiction globally to issue guidelines on merger
remedies22, the aim of the notice being to set out clearly and objectively not only the
procedural, but also the substantive principles guiding the Commission’s assessment23.
Adopting a functional perspective, the Commission considered in this Notice as remedies the
modifications to concentrations provided by the undertakings concerned in their
commitments, ‘since their object is to eliminate the competition concerns identified by the
Commission’24.
B. An Introduction to the legal framework
18 Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P, RTE & ITP v. Commission [1995] ECR I743, para 93.
19 See, for instance the recitals of the EC Merger Regulation 4064/89, [1990] OJ L 357/13 noting that
‘‘this Regulation cannot, because of the diversity of national law, fix a single deadline for the adoption of
remedies’’; Commission Decision 96/648/EC of 24 April 1996 (Case No IV/M. 269 - Shell/Montecatini),
OJ [1996] L294/10, para. 20.
20 Commission Decision 94/601/EC of 13 July 1994 (IV/C/33.833 - Cartonboard) [1994] OJ L 243/1,
para. 165 seq.; 97/780/EC: Commission Decision of 29 October 1997 relating to a proceeding pursuant to
Article 85 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case No IV/35.830 - Unisource)
(Only the Dutch, English and Swedish texts are authentic) (Text with EEA relevance)
[1997] OJ L 318/1, para. 98 (referring to civil remedies for anticompetitive practices in front of national
courts)
21 85/609/EEC: Commission Decision of 14 December 1985 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of
the EEC Treaty (IV/30.698 - ECS/AKZO) (Only the Dutch text is authentic)
[1985] OJ L 374/1, para. 96 seq (including under the title of remedies, sanctions and termination of the
infringement); 88/138/EEC: Commission Decision of 22 December 1987 relating to a proceeding under
Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (IV/30.787 and 31.488 - Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti) [1988] OJ L L 065/19, para
99 seq (sanctions and termination of the infringement); 88/518/EEC: Commission Decision of 18 July
1988 relating to a proceeding under Article 86 of the EEC Treaty (Case No IV/30.178 Napier Brown -
British Sugar) (Only the English text is authentic) [1988] OJ L 284/41, para 83 seq (fines and termination
of infringement).
22 Commission notice on remedies acceptable under Council Regulation (EEC) No 4064/89 and under
Commission Regulation (EC) No 447/98 (OJ C 68, 2.3.2001) revised in 2008: Commission notice on remedies
acceptable under council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004,
[2008] OJ C 267/1 (hereinafter, Commission Notice on remedies 2008).
23 Report from the Commission – XXXth Report on competition policy 2000/ SEC/2001/0694 final/ , para 234
and 268-277.
24 Commission Notice on remedies 2008, op. cit., para 2. The Commission defines ‘competition concerns’ as
‘serious doubts or preliminary findings that the concentration is likely to significantly impede effective
competition in the common market or in a substantial part of it, in particular as a result of the creation or
strengthening of a dominant position’. The Commission proceeded further by establishing in 2000 an
enforcement unit within the Merger Task Force dedicated to advising on the acceptability and implementation of
remedies in merger cases in order to ensure that the general principles set out in the remedies notice are applied
as consistently as possible while taking account of the specific requirements of each case: Report from the
Commission, XXXIst Report on Competition Policy 2001 /SEC/2002/0462 final, para. 290.
9Merger remedies may be suggested by the parties (commitments) on an informal
basis, even before notification of the projected merger to the Commission25 and in the course
of phase I of merger control (leading to an Article 6(2) Regulation 139/2004 decision). As the
aim of phase I remedies is to provide ‘clear-cut’ answers to a ‘readily-identified competition
concern’, only limited modifications of the transaction can be accepted in the proposed
commitments. According to the Notice, in merger control, ‘the Commission is not in a
position to impose unilaterally any conditions to an authorization decision, but only on the
basis of the parties’ commitments’26. Remedies can also be proposed by the parties in phase
II within the legal deadline set in order to secure the clearance of the merger by the
Commission pursuant to Article 8(2) of the Merger Regulation 139/2004. If, however, the
parties do not propose remedies adequate to eliminate the ‘competition concerns’, the
Commission’s only option is to adopt a prohibition decision.
The procedure is formalized as the parties are required to provide the Commission
detailed information on the content of the commitments offered and the conditions for their
implementation, thus showing their suitability to remove any significant impediment to
effective competition. The parties provide this detailed information in a Form RM27.
Remedies provided in the context of merger control have thus a strong consensual element, as
they emanate from the parties, in both form and substance, being accessory to a conditional
clearance decision and emanating from a discussion between the Commission and the parties,
under the shadow of a possible prohibition decision. The only possibility for the Commission
to impose unilaterally remedies in the context of merger control is provided for in Article
8(4) of Regulation 139/2004, which acknowledges the power of the Commission to dissolve
an already consumed concentration or to ‘restore the situation prevailing prior to the
implementation’ of a concentration that was declared incompatible with the common market
or implemented in contravention of a decision under Article 8(2) of Reg. 139/2004.
Remedies are more formalized in the context of the implementation of the ex post
control of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 makes for the first
time explicit provision of the Commission’s power to impose ‘remedies’ to undertakings
having being found to infringe Articles 101 and 102 in order to bring the infringement to an
end. The Commission also refers to them as ‘coercive measures’28. While in its previous
decisional practice the Commission included fines and injunctions within the category of
‘termination of the infringement’, Regulation 1/2003 establishes a clear distinction between
the two. According to recital 12 and Article 7, the Commission may impose on infringers
25 Commission Notice on remedies acceptable under the Council Regulation (EC) No 139/2004 and under
Commission Regulation (EC) No 802/2004, [2008] OJ C 267/1, para. 78.
26 Ibid., para. 85.
27 Annex IV, Commission Regulation (EC) No. 802/2004 implementing Council Regulation (EC) No. 139/2004
on the control of concentrations between undertakings, [2004] OJ L 133/39, amended by Commission
Regulation (EC) No. 1033/2008, [2008] OJ L 279/3.
28 Recital 14, Regulation 1/2003.
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‘behavioural or structural remedies which are proportionate to the infringement committed
and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end’. Structural remedies are subject
to a stricter proportionality requirement as they can only be imposed ‘either where there is no
equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy
would be more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy’. Fines
are dealt in Article 23, under a chapter titled ‘penalties’ and cannot exceed 10per cent of the
total turnover of the undertaking the preceding business year, thus introducing a quantitative
measure of proportionality. There is no reason given for the introduction of this
differentiation on the qualitative or quantitative expression of the proportionality principle,
although it may be explained by the different forms of judicial scrutiny of fines and remedies.
According to recital 33, all decisions of the Commission are subject to review by the Court of
Justice yet the Court is given unlimited jurisdiction in respect of decisions by which the
Commission imposes fines, according to Article 261 TFEU, which provides the possibility to
the EU Institutions to expand the jurisdiction of the Court for ‘penalties’. This provision was
implemented for Articles 101 and 102 infringements by Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003 and
for merger control by Article 16 of Regulation 139/2004. In contrast, other ‘remedies’ are
subject to the normal jurisdiction of the Court. It seems that the punitive character of fines
explains why they are subject to this more extensive judicial scrutiny than remedies29. The
distinction between remedies and fines also appears in some OECD documents, where it is
recognized that
‘[t]ypically, remedies aim to stop a violator’s unlawful conduct, its anticompetitive
effects, and their recurrence, as well as to restore competition. Sanctions are usually
meant to deter unlawful conduct in the future, to compensate victims, and to force
violators to disgorge their illegal gains’30.
According to this view and that of Regulation 1/2003, the legal category of ‘remedies’,
comprises only permanent injunctions31 which should be distinguished from fines, penalties
or sanctions32.
29 For the distinction between ‘penalties’ and remedies see Article 5 Regulation 1/2003 referring to fines,
payments or penalties as a different category of decisions that those ‘requiring that an infringement be brought
to an end’, the latter category including structural and behavioral remedies.
30 OECD (2006) ‘Remedies and Sanctions in Abuse of Dominance Cases’, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/20/17/38623413.pdf, at p. 18.
31 Permanent injunctions should be distinguished from interim or preliminary injunctions, which are dealt, under
Regulation 1/2003, by Articles 5 and 8 (interim measures) and commitments, which are dealt by Article 9 of
Regulation 1/2003.
32 For a similar distinction between ‘remedies’ perceived as measures (and including damages) and ‘sanctions’,
see Directive 2004/48/EC on the enforcement of intellectual property rights, [2004] OJ L195/16, chapters II and
III.
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The concept of remedies has also been used to describe the various civil consequences
of competition law infringements in national courts. These include the nullity of a contract
found to infringe Article 101 [according to article 101(2)], damages for EU competition law
infringements33 and injunctive relief by the civil courts34. The Commission has used the term
‘remedies’ to describe the actions for breach of EU antitrust rules35. Some AGs have also
occasionally referred to ‘remedial relief’ for competition law damages and injunctions36. It
seems, therefore, that there are, at least, some indications that the EU authorities adopt a
broader definition of remedies than the one suggested in Article 8 of regulation 1/2003. They
have included under the category of remedies, injunctions, fines, as well as ‘civil law’
remedies (such as damages and injunctions imposed by the judiciary). No specific criteria are
nevertheless offered for defining the category of ‘remedies’, the EU institutions having taken
approaches that might appear contradictory. Hence the need for an effort of legal taxonomy
with the aim to build a coherent theory of competition law remedies, for descriptive but also
normative purposes.
C. An effort of legal taxonomy
A possible source of inspiration for this taxonomy might be the approach followed in the
legal systems of the EU Member States. The analysis of various national practices shows that
the concept of ‘remedies’ is not known in a number of civil law systems and even contested
in anglo-american law (1). For this reason, we will proceed to a functional definition of the
term (2).
1. The concept of remedy in the legal systems of EU member states
(a) Remedies in the common law tradition
In its well known study of remedies in English law, Rafal Zakrewski noted the absence of a
‘stable core meaning’ of remedies noting that the term ‘is used synonymously with a wide
range of different terms and what is probably worse, by way of contrast to an equally long
and diverse list’37. Peter Birks found the term ‘chameleonic, for as the context shifts its
meaning takes on different colours,’ for example, ‘in the medical world, a remedy may be
33 Case C-453/99, Courage and Crehan, [2001] ECR I-6297; Joined cases C-295-298/04, Manfredi, [2006] ECR
I-6619.
34 Which according to AG Jacobs should be subject to the same reasoning as damages: see case C-264/01, AOK
Bundesverband [2004] ECR I-2493, para. 104.
35 See, Commission Staff Working paper, Annex to the Green paper – Damages actions for breach of the EC
antitrust rules, SEC(2005) 1732; COM(2005) 672 final, para. 17-18, 20.
36 Opinion of AG Jacobs, in Joined cases C-264/01 & 306/01, C-354-355/01, AOK Bundesverband, [2004] ECR
I-2493, para. 21.
37 Zakrewski, R. (2005) Remedies Reclassified, Oxford: Oxford University Press.(P. 2.
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either curative, therapeutic or both’38; Waddams noted that ‘(t)heoretically, almost every
legal question could be posed in terms of remedies, but this would give the word so wide a
meaning as to be useless’39. Undeniably, any attempt to provide a more precise legal
definition of the term has faced important conceptual difficulties. The concept of remedies
has multiple meaning, some of which overlap: remedies may be corrective or preventive (the
broad functional definition of the remedy) or they may be considered as an action or a cause
of action, a substantive right, a court order, a final outcome40.
The taxonomies of remedies proposed depend on the selected criteria for
classification: (i) coercive versus non-coercive (declaratory, constitutive) remedies; (ii)
substitutionary (remedies for performance, such as damages) versus specific remedies
(injunctions); (iii) remedies classified according to their function (compensation, restitution,
punishment, coercion and declaratory relief), there are different possibilities of
classification41
Zakrewski adopts a narrow definition of remedy as a concept to be distinguished from
substantive rights (primary and secondary), the criterion of the distinction being a purely
formal one, the involvement of a court order: ‘remedies are the rights that arise from a
particular class of events, namely, the making of certain judicial commands or statements’42.
Based on this definition, and rejecting a ‘goal-based’ taxonomy of compensation, restitution
and punishment43, he distinguishes between remedies replicating substantive rights and
remedies that ‘modify or transform the parties’ substantive rights to a significant extent’44.
The new taxonomy introduced by Zakrewski, which he claims may extend to non-
civil remedies, is intrinsically linked to the relationship to and the effect the remedies have on
the substantive rights, prior to the court ordering the remedy45. A remedy may replicate the
substantive right, in the sense that the claimant is not getting anything to which he or she did
not have a substantive right prior to the court’s order, which either evaluated the right in a
quantitative form (e.g. damages) or rendered the right more precise and restated it in an
injunction, but it may also provide the courts discretion to ‘fashion remedies that do not
resemble any substantive rights which the claimant can be said to have had before the order
was made’46.
38 Parker, K. E. (1975) Modern Judicial Remedies: Cases and Materials. Boston, MA. USA: Little Brown. P. 10
see also Birks, supra note 14 (‘anything that alleviates, eliminates, or prevents can be referred to as a remedy’).
39 Waddams, S.M. (1983) ‘Remedies as a Legal Subject’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 3 113,
40 Zakrewski, supra n. 38, pp. 11-22.
41 Ibid., pp. 23-42.
42 Ibid., pp. 46-47.
43 Zakrewski explains this choice by the fact that one cannot construct an adequate goal-based series to cover all
remedies and that the goals of remedies are too diverse and some remedies may be counted in in many
categories if a goal-based classification were adopted (Ibid., p. 78).
44 Ibid., p. 60.
45 Ibid., pp. 78-79
46 Ibid., p. 80.
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Transformative remedies may create de novo or extinguish existing rights. Although
discretion is not the distinguishing criterion, as damages in English law are provided for by
common law and are subject to detailed rules of causation, remoteness and mitigation, while
specific performance which is an equitable remedy, is not subject to these rules, it plays an
important role in Zakrewski ‘s taxonomy. Transformative remedies ‘often’ involve a degree
of discretion, as they involve ‘a choice as to whether to create the remedy and what content it
should have’47. In other words, ‘the remedial discretion usually associated with
transformative remedies is discretion to create a remedy which bears little resemblance to the
claimant’s substantive rights’48. Some may find these duties or rights-creating power of the
judge, inherent in the concept of transformative remedies, to amount to some form of law-
making ‘at the instance-specific level (‘or remedy level’), thus raising important rule of law
issues. Transformative remedies promote of course on the one side flexible decision-making
and a case-by-case approach, but they can also generate, on the other side, uncertainty as to
the predictability of decisions and equality before the law. Indeed, the rule of law implies that
society administers justice by fixing standards that provide like treatment to similar cases and
that individuals may determine prior to the litigation.
(b) Remedies in the civil law tradition
The legal concept of remedy is generally foreign to civil law tradition49. In French law, the
concept has no legal definition. If one adopts a functional definition of a remedy as
something that aims to redress a ‘wrong’, the French legal system has not developed a
general theory of remedies for the violation of civil obligations, no equivalent concept
existing as such in French law, but incorporates the issue of remedial action in the substantive
law of obligations with regard to contractual and tort liability, thus building an intrinsic
relation between the remedy and the right or the wrong to be repaired50. A similar situation
occurs in German law, although the reform of the law of obligations in 2002 seems to have
led to important changes by establishing a system of rules structured primarily according to
the types of legal remedies available to redress the ‘violation of an obligation’51.
The concept of remedies is more familiar in public law, in view of the principle of
effective judicial protection, a general principle of EU law stemming from the constitutional
47 Ibid., p. 97. According to Zakrewski, to the difference of the discretion existing for replicative remedies,
which cannot order something that is not defined by the substantive right, the discretion involved in
transformative remedies carries a choice to order something, not defined by substantive law (ibid., p. 98).
48 Ibid., p. 102.
49 For an interesting comparative analysis, see Adar, Y. & G. Shalev, (2008) ‘The Law of Remedies in a Mixed
Jurisdiction: The Israeli Experience’ Electronic Journal of Comparative Law 12(1) 111-141.
50 David René (1980). A Law of Remedies and a Law of Rights, in English Law and French Law: A Comparison
in Substance. London: Stevens & Sons, ch. 1, Pp. 1-15.
51 Zimmermann, R. (2006). The New German law of Obligations: Historical and Comparative Perspectives.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
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traditions common to the Member States and mentioned in Article 47 of the Charter of
Fundamental rights, which requires Member States to establish a system of legal remedies
and procedures ensuring respect for the rights recognized by EU law and guaranteeing that
the detailed procedural rules governing actions for safeguarding an individual’s rights under
EU law are no less favourable than those governing similar domestic actions (principle of
equivalence) and do not render practically impossible or excessively difficult the exercise of
rights conferred by Community law (principle of effectiveness)52.
In view of the vagueness of the existing definitions of the legal concept of a remedy in
EU law as well as in various national legal systems, a functional definition of this concept
may provide some useful insights.
2. A functional definition of the legal concept of remedy in EU competition law
Taking stock of the absence of a clear definition of the concept of ‘remedy’ in EU
competition law and in view of the unsettled position of the concept in national legal systems,
a functional definition may offer the only way out of this definitional conundrum. The focus
should be on the principal functions of the remedial process, as it is generally conceived in
various legal systems and in the decisional practice of EU institutions, which, as we have
hinted to earlier, can be perceived broadly as compensation, restitution, punishment and
prophylaxis (prevention). Competition law remedies are adopted with the principal aim to
restore competition in the market.53 However, this objective may be conceived broadly as
including first the ‘micro’ goals of putting the infringement to an end, compensating the
victims,54 and curing the particular problem to competition, but also the ‘macro’ goal of
putting incentives in place ‘so as to minimize the recurrence of just such anticompetitive
conduct’ (preventive remedies or deterrence)55. Different types of remedies may perform
various overlapping functions.
Looking more specifically to these ‘micro-goals’, remedies seek generally to restore
‘the plaintiff’s rightful position, that is, the position that the plaintiff would have occupied if
the defendant had never violated the law’ or ‘to restore the defendants to the defendant’s
rightful position, that is, the position that the defendant would have occupied absent the
52 Case C-213/89, The Queen v Secretary of State for Transport, ex parte: Factortame Ltd and others [1990]
ECR I-2433; Case C-50/00, [2002] ECR I-6677, para. 41 (‘it is for the Member States to establish a system of
legal remedies and procedures which ensure respect for the right to effective judicial protection’); Case C-
432/05, Unibet (London) Ltd and Unibet (International) Lt v Justitiekanslern, [2007} ECR I-2271, paras 42-44.
53 See Melamed, A. D. (2009) ‘Afterword: The Purposes of Antitrust Remedies’, Antitrust Law Journal L.J 76
359. .
54 Taking illegal gains away from the law violators and ‘restore those monies to the victims’ constitutes a
principal goal of competition law remedies. Pitofsky, R. (2002 ‘Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First
Century: The Matter of Remedies’, Georgetown Law Journal. 91 169, 170).
55 Fox, E. M. (2005) ‘Remedies and the Courage of Convictions in a Globalized World: How Globalization
Corrupts Relief’, Tulane Law Review 80 571, 573.
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violation.’56 In other words, remedies are perceived as a cure to a ‘wrong’ the infringer
committed, ‘in contravention of some legally-recognized right of the plaintiff’s’57 or of the
category of right-recipients that the legislator intended to protect. The wrong of the defendant
gives rise to the enforceable right of the plaintiff (or any other protected category the plaintiff
represents) to impose on the defendant a correlative duty to stop the illegal behaviour, pay
damages, make restitution, or adopt a specific behaviour. Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 does
not oppose this conceptualization of remedies, as it links the adoption of a remedy to the end
of the infringement, a concept that might be understood narrowly, the termination of the
illegal conduct, but also, more broadly, as outcome-oriented, thus requiring the reversal of the
effects of the illegal conduct. Following the imposition of a remedy, the infringer will be
asked to commit negative acts (a requirement not to act in a certain way) and/or positive acts
(a requirement to act in a certain way). Curing the competition law ‘wrong’ committed or
providing recovery for the primary and secondary rights violated may take the form of
restitution (which involves gain-based recovery) and/or compensation (which involves loss-
based recovery). Restitution and compensation may thus be considered as the two facets of
the ‘curing’ function of the remedial process, as opposed to the punishing and prophylactic
one.
Among the remedies available for ‘curing’ the competition law violation, one may
distinguish between administrative remedies, imposed by the Commission and other national
competition authorities, and civil law remedies, which are the province of national courts.
Among the administrative remedies, one could list the remedial injunctions of Article
7 of Regulation 1/2003, negative (termination of the infringement) or positive (structural and
behavioural remedies), the decisions of Articles 6(2) and 8(2) of Regulation 139/2004 that
lead to a prohibition of anticompetitive mergers (negative obligation) or their conditional
clearance (positive obligation) and possibly fines under Article 23 of Regulation 1/2003, to
the degree that fines may be considered as a substitutionary remedy compensating the
‘general public’ for the distortion of the competitive process. The remedy of disgorging
illegal profits is not available, as such, in EU competition law, although it remains possible
under some national competition law systems58. As fines in EU competition law are assessed
with reference to the value of sales to which the infringement directly or indirectly relates in
the relevant geographic market in the EU and the degree of gravity of the infringement
multiplied by the number of years of the infringement, they may also be considered as
56 Laycock, D. (1994) Modern American Remedies: Cases and Materials. S Little Brown, p. 2.
57 Tilbury, M, M. Noone, & B. Kercher, (2000) Remedies: Commentary and Materials. London: LBC
Information Services. LBC Information Services
58 See, for instance, in Germany, where the FCO may skim-off economic benefits related to the infringement.
This is possible for both proceedings concerning Administrative fines (Section 81-4 GWB post-2005 or Section
81-2 GWD pre-2005) applying to cartels and administrative proceedings for non-cartel activity (which are dealt
under section 34 GWB). The economic benefits to be disgorged not only encompass the net revenue generated
because of the infraction, but also (the monetary value of) any other benefits such as the improvement of an
undertaking’s market position.
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exercising a partial and implicit disgorgement function. One could finally list measures that
are accessory to the principal curative remedies because they facilitate their enforcement,
such as interim measures (which aim to ensure interim relief) and periodic penalties (in order
to compel the infringers to comply with the prohibition and/or the positive requirements-
injunctions imposed by the Commission and NRAs).
Civil remedies ‘curing’ the competition law violations include the nullity of
agreements and decisions prohibited by Article 101 TFEU, according to Article 101(2), the
award of damages for the violation of Articles 101 and/or 102 TFEU (either compensatory
and/or restitutionary) and injunctions (prohibitory or mandatory) with the aim to terminate
the infringement and restoring the competitive process or the situation of the parties prior to
the infringement.
The punishment of the competition law infringer is certainly an objective pursued by
competition law remedies. We consider that punishment constitutes one of the three remedial
functions, broadly perceived, as it aims to cure the violation of the moral rights of the
communities affected by the competition law infringement and constitutes a ritual of justice.
Punishment is certainly the main function of fines imposed in the context of Article 23 of
Regulation 1/2003, in view of the ‘aggravating’ circumstances taken into account in their
calculation for recidivists, instigators or leaders of competition law infringements and
undertakings obstructing the Commission’s investigations59, as well as the specific ‘increase
for deterrence’ that the Commission may impose to infringers. The explicit acknowledgment
in the Commission’s Guidelines on the methods of setting fines that it will increase the fine
‘in order to exceed the amount of gains improperly made as a result of the infringement
where it is possible to estimate that amount’, is an additional indication of this punitive
function60. In contrast to some national legal systems, there are no criminal or individual
sanctions imposed in EU competition law. Civil remedies aiming to punish may include the
possibility of punitive or exemplary damages.61. However, some recent proposals envision
the possibility for double or multiple damages for competition law infringements, thus
introducing an additional punitive civil remedy to the arsenal available to national courts62.
Yet, it should remain clear that punitive damages and fines cannot be combined as this might
lead to jeopardise the principle that a wrongdoer ought not to be punished twice for the same
59 European Commission, Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2) of
Regulation No 1/2003, [2006] OJ C 210/2, para. 28.
60 Ibid., paras 30-31.
See, in the UK, the situation following the High Court’s decision in Devenish Nutrition Limited and others v.
Sanofi-Aventis SA and others [2007] EWHC 2394 (Ch). The availability of exemplary damages has not been
appealed to the Court of Appeal in this case, Exemplary damages are in theory available for infringements of the
competition rules when it is necessary to punish the infringer but their award is discretionary and the courts
must exercise their discretion with caution. See, also Albion Water Limited v. Dŵr Cymru Cyfyngedig [2011]
CAT 18.
62 European Commission, Green Paper – Damages actions for breach of the EC Antitrust Rules, COM(2005)
672 final, Section 2.3 (option 15).
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wrong. In Devenish, the English High Court excluded the possibility of punitive damages
where fines have already been imposed upon a defendant (or would have been imposed were
it not for a successful leniency application) by an EU or UK competition authority, as this
would run contrary to the obligation of national courts to take decisions that conflict with
Commission’s decisions, as expressed in Article 16 of Regulation 1/2003.
Competition law remedies may also have a prophylactic (preventive) aim. They seek
to ensure that there remain no practices likely to result in distortions of competition and
infringements in the future. The preventive function is fulfilled in a different way than for
curative and punitive remedies, which may also indirectly affect the incentives of market
actors to act in a specific way in the future. First, preventive remedies aim directly to specific
or general deterrence. Specific deterrence can be defined as the impact of the remedy on the
incentives of those apprehended (the infringers) to adopt similar illegal behaviour in the
future. General deterrence focuses on the public at large. Second, remedies may have a pure
prophylactic function. Prophylactic remedies can be distinguished from specific deterrence as
they affect the ability (and not the incentive) of the infringers to commit equivalent
anticompetitive practices in the future by focusing on specific facilitators of potential
infringements. These are not illegal practices in themselves, but in the specific circumstances
of the case, they may facilitate illegal conduct. By prohibiting these practices, the decision-
maker’s objective is not to deter the potential infringers from adopting such conduct, as this is
not illegal, but to reduce their ability to commit illegal practices.
Specific deterrence is certainly a difficult venture that requires from the courts a
guessing exercise linked to a counterfactual and some prospective analysis of the situation in
the market with and without the specific competition law violations. This is particularly true
in complex and dynamically evolving markets, where static models cannot easily predict the
various incentives of the different market actors in the future. Specific deterrence may be
achieved with administrative remedies, such as declaratory relief, positive injunctions
(forward-looking structural and behavioural remedies aiming not only to cure the competition
law wrong but also to design the market interactions in such as way that the problem does not
occur again in the future), civil mandatory injunctions (although these are rarely provided for
by the civil courts63) and restitutionary damages. General deterrence may be achieved with a
wider array of measures, such as fines, restitutionary and punitive damages and harsh (in the
sense of imposing an important burden to the infringer) mandatory remedies (in particular
63 For an interesting analysis, see Peyer, S., Injunctive Relief and Private Antitrust Enforcement, (2011). CCP
Working Paper No. 11-7. Available at SSRN http://ssrn.com/abstract=1861861 (noting the prevalence of
permanent (as opposed to interim) injunctive relief in Germany, while UK courts prefer the award of damages).
Although courts may provide injunctive relief in France, this remedy has been rarely used by judges, as no text
provides explicitly for the possibility of mandatory injunction for the courts in the area of competition law,
while there exists a specific legal basis for the law of restrictive trade practices (unfair competition) : Sofianatos,
G. A. (2009) Injonctions et Engagements en Droit de la Concurrence, Paris : LGDJ, pp 109-143 ; Claudel E.
(2005) ‘Injonctions’ Les Petites Affiches 394(14) 23-30.
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structural remedies or heavy-handed behavioural remedies). The following table summarizes
the classification of competition law remedies according to their function.
Table 1
Function of the
remedies
Curative Punishing Preventing
Administrative
remedial process
 Termination of the
infringement
 Behavioural
remedies
 Structural remedies
 Fines (to a certain
extent)
 Accessory remedies
 Fines SPECIFIC DETERRENCE
 Fines
 Termination of the
Infringement
 Forward looking
structural and
behavioural
remedies
GENERAL DETERRENCE
 Fines
 Structural remedies
 Heavy-handed long
duration
behavioural
remedies
PROPHYLACTIC
REMEDIES
Civil remedial
process
 Declaratory relief
 Prohibitory
injunctions
 Mandatory
injunctions
 Compensatory
damages
 Restitutionary
damages
 Exemplary
(punitive
damages)
 Criminal and
individual
sanctions
SPECIFIC DETERRENCE
 Mandatory
injunctions
 Restitutionary
damages
 Exemplary
(punitive) damages
GENERAL DETERRENCE
 Restitutionary
damages
 Exemplary
(punitive) damages
 Harsh mandatory
injunctions
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PROPHYLACTIC
REMEDIES
III. Remedial discretion and its boundaries
Both competition authorities and courts dispose of some discretion in fashioning competition
law remedies. However important this discretion is, it should not lead to what some authors
describe as ‘discretionary remedialism’ 64. ‘Discretionary remedialism’ is the view that courts
and competition authorities have discretion to award the ‘appropriate’ or optimal remedy in
the circumstances of each individual case rather than being limited to specific (perhaps
historically determined) remedies for each category of causative events65. In an economically
oriented competition law, the definition of what is “optimal” or “appropriate” may be
influenced by the view economists have on optimal deterrence (the optimal deterrence model)
and on how the market equilibrium existing prior to the competition wrong may be improved
by subsequent remedial action. The remedy may thus offer the opportunity to design a new
market equilibrium, more competitive than the one following the infringement, but also, in
some circumstances, more competitive than the one existing prior to the infringement. This
understanding of “optimal” remedies seems in conflict with the dominant views in both
public and private law on the purpose and the scope of remedial action.
This part aims to examine the degree of remedial discretion decision-makers have
been recognized in EU competition law. In order to examine this question, it is important to
clarify conceptually the inherent limits of remedial discretion in the way these are generally
conceived in private and public law. Our assumption is that the legal concept of remedies and
hence the scope of remedial discretion is profoundly influenced by the doctrines of private
and public law that have shaped our understanding, as lawyers, of the boundaries of remedial
discretion. Competition law is enforced by administrative authorities and civil courts, and it is
possible that each of them may have different perspectives on the concept of remedy and
what this entails in terms of remedial discretion, the institutional and legal setting to which
they are incorporated inevitably influencing their conception of the boundaries of their
remedial power. Hence, the need to take a short deviation from the development of the
concept of remedy in competition law in order to explore how these accounts may restrict the
remedial decision-making space of competition authorities and courts.
64 A term first employed in the context of restitution by Professor Birks, P. (2000) ‘Three Kinds of Objection to
Discretionary Remedialism’ University of Western Australia Law Review. 29, 1, who was a fervent critic of
‘discretionary remedialism.’
65 Evans, S (2001) ‘Defending Discretionary Remedialism’, Sydney Law Review. 23, 463, 463. For a general
discussion; see Jensen, D.M. (2003) ‘The Rights and Wrongs of Discretionary Remedialism’, Singapore J.
Legal Studies 178-208.
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A. A private law account of competition law remedies and remedial discretion
In private law, remedies are usually perceived as intrinsically related to rights. The linkage of
remedies to rights is exemplified by the maxim, ubi jus, ibi remedium, which assumes that
rights are legal prerequisites for remedies while, at the same time, a right (and its
corresponding duty) defines a remedy. This has important implications on remedial
discretion. It is, however, important to examine if rights and remedies are independent
concepts, and if this is the case, define the nature of their relationship (hierarchical or
heterarchical).
1. Rights/wrongs and remedies: monist versus dualist views
Rights and remedies may be viewed as related (not entirely independent) concepts.
Some have opposed a monist to a dualist view, the monist one integrating the right and the
remedy and treating the latter as the ‘mirror image or reflex of the right’, while the dualist
view separating the right and the remedy and postulating that the decision-maker, in
determining the remedy, ‘chooses from the basket of all potential remedies the context-
specific one that is most appropriate in the circumstances’66. The monist conception amounts
to a ‘unity of the right-remedy model’, which assumes that the remedy constitutes an integral
part of the right and that a remedy (or lack of it) is an attribute of the legal right67. Under this
approach, a right would be classified as weak or strong, according to the effectiveness of
remedies available for its protection. A right protected by punitive damages would thus be
stronger than one protected by compensatory damages68. Yet, this approach does not explain
the discretion decision-makers enjoy in choosing different remedial strategies for the
violation of the same right, in which case the strength and the nature of the right might only
be defined ex post. Some other authors advance the view that remedies are secondary rights
‘of instrumental character’: they imply the existence of primary rights that are conferred ‘for
the better protection and enforcement of those other rights and duties whose existence they so
suppose.’69 This approach relies on the existence of a close connection between the
substantive right and the remedy. The latter is conceived as a secondary right, superposed to
the superstructure of the primary right that has been violated (wrong). Wrongs are violations
of primary rights that give rise to secondary rights, whose nature may be sanctioning
(preventive) or purely remedial (reparative).
66 On this opposition see Weinrib, E. J. (2008) ‘Two Conceptions of Remedies’, in Rickett, Charles EF (Eds)
Justifying Private Law Remedies. Oxford: Hart Publishing Press., pp. 33-32.
67 Friedmann, D. (2005) ‘Rights and Remedies’, in Nili Cohen and Ewan McKendrick (Eds) Comparative
Remedies for Breach of Contract. Oxford: Hart Publishing Press. Pp. 3-17, at p. 10.
68 Ibid., at 11.
69 Austin, J. (1885) Lectures on Jurisprudence or the Philosophy of Positive Law, Robert Campbell (Ed.)
(1885). London: John Murray. P. 762.
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A wrong gives rise to a secondary (remedial) right if there is a legal cause of action.
The concept of legal cause of action breaks the direct causality chain between primary rights
and remedies implied by the maxim ubi jus, ibi remedium. A specific remedy does not
necessarily follow the violation of the primary right. The relation between these three
concepts has been explained in the following terms:
‘Primary rights describe a person’s initial legal entitlement. Secondary rights describe
the remedies to which he is entitled if the primary right is violated. When this
violation takes place (for example, a tort is committed or contract breached), we talk
of there being an injustice and a legal cause of action. Causes of action describe those
events which consist in the violation of private law rights, or, to use different words of
my own, primary injustices. Remedies constitute the law’s response to such events
and describe a secondary level of entitlement, substituted by the law for the first.
Causes of action provide us with answers to the question when legal relief is to be
given; remedies answer the question how it is to be given’.70
The reference to ‘causes of action’ provides an intermediary step between primary
rights and remedies, thus making clear that the two concepts should be distinguished from
each other. The criteria used to define the violation of the primary right are not similar to
those giving birth to the secondary right. The two can indeed operate independently of one
another. The violation of a primary right may yield a whole range of responses: different
types of secondary rights, which do not necessarily have any logical connection to the
specific wrong, or violation of the primary right. Courts usually enjoy a broad discretion as to
the choice of the remedy to be granted, with the consequence that different remedies may be
used for the violation of the same primary right: ‘as a jellyfish trails its tentacles in the warm
sea, so from many civil wrongs dangle a plurality of remedial strings.’71 Hence, law treats
substantive rights and remedies as distinct concepts. At the same time, employing the
terminology ‘causes of action’ indicates that the concept of remedy should not be confined to
‘forms of action’, that is legal claims that are channelled through (and understood by
reference to) prescribed forms of action.72
A similar result as to the independence of the concepts of right and remedy may be
achieved with the ‘acoustic separation model’, suggested by some commentators73.
According to this model, legal rules are divided into ‘conduct rules’ that are intended to guide
70 Barker, K. (1998) ‘Rescuing  Remedialism in Unjust Enrichment Law: Why Remedies Are Right’,
Cambridge Law Journal. 57. Pp. 301, 319.
71 Birks, P. (2000) ‘Three Kinds of Objection to Discretionary Remedialism’, University of Western Australia
Law Review. 29. Pp . 1, 7.
72 Barker, K., op. cit., p. 312.
73 Friedmann, D., op. cit., p. 12 (Building on the work of Cohen, M. Dan. (2002) Harmful Thoughts: Essays on
law, Self and Morality. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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private actors in their conduct, and ‘decision rules’ which regulate the activity of the officials
implementing the law. The private actors are only aware of the conduct rules and ignore the
decision rules, which are applied by the decision-maker once the conduct rule has been
violated. The model assumes that each type of rule is animated by different values and is
subject to different constraints and that it might make sense in some circumstances to
construct a conduct rule broadly (so as to deter harmful behaviour) and a decision rule
narrowly (the decision-maker taking into account other considerations, such as concerns of
administrability of the remedy, likely chilling effects, administrative costs etc). The acoustic
model provides a convenient way to cope with the different constraints to which conduct and
decision rules are subject to, while at the same time recognizing that rights and remedies are
intrinsically related, the direction of the interaction being a matter left to each legal system, as
either decision rules will embody conduct rules or decision rules will follow conduct rules.
Alternatively, it is possible to consider that a remedy is ‘an action, or the law’s
configuration of the actionability of a claimant’s story’ and thus to establish a strict
separation between the concept of remedy and that of the violation of the primary right [or
secondary right] and the wrong committed.74 The term remedial will be used in this context
essentially as a synonym of discretionary.75 This position conceptualizes remedies as a
specific form of judicial decision-making. Zakrzewski distinguishes clearly between
substance (primary and secondary rights) and remedies, in view of his narrow definition of
the remedy as ‘rights arising from certain judicial commands or statements’76. The court
order signals the end of substance and the beginning of the remedial realm77. The remedies
will be in the decision-maker’s discretion according to the criteria of appropriateness. The
substantive rights identified in the liability phase and the remedies are thus understood as
separate concepts although ‘liability triggers the court’s discretion in the matter of the
remedy.’78 Rejecting the existence of a connection between primary/secondary rights and
remedies, the theory of discretionary remedialism tolerates few limits to remedial discretion.
Remedies can be replicative of the substantive rights or transformative, the degree of
discretion of the judge (or decision-maker) being wider in the second category.
Such a conception of remedies may lead to increased uncertainty and unpredictability.
Uncertainty and unpredictability are certainly to be avoided with regard to the areas of law
that rely on private governance (i.e., contracts and torts), where the aim is to facilitate the
exercise of private choice in the most efficient way.79 But is predictability and certainty
necessary to the same extent within a regime of public governance, such as competition law?
74 Birks, P., op. cit., p. 10.
75 Id. p. 17.
76 R. Zakrezewski, op. cit., p. 61.
77 Ibid., p. 53.
78 Birks, P., op. cit., p. 23.
79 On the classification of the legal system in regimes of private and public governance, see Ogus, Antony.
(2006) Costs and Cautionary Tales: Economic Insights for the Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing Press. Pp. 71-86.
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For example, it is possible to argue that greater predictability of the competition law remedy
might facilitate the breach of the primary right, as it would be possible for the undertaking to
calculate precisely the costs and benefits resulting from the violation and therefore to make
sure that the breach of the primary right is profitable. However, contrary to what might
happen in regimes of private governance,80 a breach of the primary right can never be
efficient in competition law, as efficiency is one of the criteria for defining the existence of a
breach. Remedial discretion and the consequent unpredictability of the remedy are therefore
tolerated, as long as it is within acceptable limits from the point of view of the rule of law.
Discretion will be constrained by rules, but these rules do not provide a stable basis for
predicting legal outcomes and the way these rules apply owe much to variable and
discretionary factors.
In conclusion, there are inherent risks in adopting a strict separation of primary rights
and remedies, and the strong discretionary remedialism that ensues. Remedies have a purpose
and this purpose is inevitably defined, at least with regard to the primary (or secondary) rights
that have been violated or the wrong that has been committed. It is impossible to totally
disconnect remedies from rights/wrongs, even if they are subject to different criteria. It
follows that there must be some degree of logical connection between primary rights/wrongs
and remedies, without that, however, leading to question the existence of two separate legal
categories. As Kit Barker rightly observes:
‘the way in which the primary right is described tends to suggest a certain logical
range of responses to its violation: to adumbrate a range of viable secondary rights . . .
The criteria which set up the primary right none the less remain distinct from those
which weigh upon a court’s decision how to respond, when it is violated’.81
In conclusion, substantive rights (or wrongs) and remedies are distinct concepts but
they should not be construed in isolation from each other. Their relationship with remedies is
reflexive82.
2. A reflexive relation between rights/wrongs and remedies
Assuming that rights and remedies are distinct/separate concepts, one could conceive their
relation as being heterarchical. A heterarchical relationship assumes that the elements may be
80 For example, the breach of a contract might be efficient because the profit of the breach would exceed the
profit from completion of the contract. See, for instance, Goetz, C. J. & R. E. Scott (1977) ‘Liquidated
Damages, Penalties and the Just Compensation Principle: Some Notes on an Enforcement Model and A Theory
of Efficient Breach’, Columbia Law Review 77 554 and the discussion in Posner, R.A. (2003) Economic
Analysis of Law. Aspen Publishers.  P. 120
81 Barker, K., op. cit., p. 320.
82 Id. p. 323.
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ranked in different ways and is usually opposed to homoarchy, a situation in which the
elements are and can be rigidly ranked one way only. One could potentially conceive that
rights precede remedies or that remedies precede rights.
Under the ‘primacy of the remedy model’, ‘it is the potency of the remedy and its
availability which determines the nature of the legal right and, indeed, its very existence’83.
The absence of a remedy will indicate the non-existence of the right. Yet, there are different
views over the linkage of remedies and rights in this context. One way to view the remedy
primacy model is that only remedies, that is the legal consequences of the violation of a right,
count, freedom of action (for the defendant) being maintained in the absence of a remedy.
Some may also advance that the violation of the right (the wrong) is not the cause of the
remedy84 but the condition for the remedy to be imposed, the decision-maker stating the
circumstances under which this remedy is available85. Others advance that the nature of the
remedy (property rights or liability) should be a criterion for the classification of rights86,
emphasizing the centrality of the remedy to the understanding of the nature of the legal right
(although this view deviates from the strict remedy primacy model, as it assumes that
‘decisions as to entitlement, namely allocation of legal rights, must precede the determination
as to their protection via the law of remedies87‘). This view of the relation between remedies
and rights implies that remedies may ignore or go beyond the wrong (or violation of the legal
right) that forms the condition of their intervention or more broadly occasions them.
The ‘primacy of the right model’ assumes that the right precedes the remedy ‘both in
time and in importance’88. Hence, an effort of legal classification will start by defining the
right before moving to the remedy, the right being the cause of the remedy. The violation of
the defendant’s right by the plaintiff is the causative event, the reason for the particular
remedy: ‘what the defendant has done to the plaintiff determines what the judge requires the
defendant to do for the plaintiff’89. The remedy is perceived as replicating/matching the
nature of the right, defined here as the structure of the relation between the plaintiff and the
defendant (or wrong), prior to the violation. This restoration should take either a qualitative
form (which requires from the plaintiff to restore to the defendant the subject matter of the
violated right) or a quantitative form, with an award of damages, which restores to the
defendant the monetary value of the subject matter of the right90.
83 Friedmann, D., op. cit., pp. 3-4.
84 The nature of the plaintiff’s infringed right defines the nature of the remedy.
85 One the opposition between the cause and the condition conceptions of remedies see, Weinrib, E. J. Two
Conceptions of Remedies, op. cit., pp. 3-8.
86 Calabresi G & D. Melamed, (1972) ‘Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the
Cathedral’, Harvard Law Review, 85 1089.
87 Friedmann D., op. cit., p. 6.
88 Ibid., p. 8.
89 Ibid., p. 4.
90 Ibid., p. 13.
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The opposition between the ‘primacy of the remedy’ and the ‘primacy of the right’
models may explain the classification of remedies as replicative and transformative in some
recent efforts of legal taxonomy in private law91. As mentioned earlier, this effort of
taxonomy classifies remedies according to their relationship to the rights which existed prior
to the finding of an infringement.
According to this rather formalistic view, replicative remedies are simply
‘restatements’ of the substantive rights existing independently before them; transformative
remedies generate ‘something which is quite different from the rights and duties which
already pertained between the parties’92. For replicative remedies, the claimant does not get
‘anything to which he or she did not have a substantive right before coming to court’93.
Replicative remedies are further divided in remedies replicating primary rights (specific
performance), those replicating secondary rights (substitutionary remedies)94. Remedies
replicating primary rights aim either to prevent the continuance of an infringement to a right
(prohibitory injunctions) or to redress a past infringement of a primary right by compelling
the doing of an act that will realize that right (mandatory injunctions). Replicative remedies
of secondary rights (e.g. award of damages) ‘restate, liquidate and replace’ the pre-existing
secondary rights95. The pre-existing secondary right may be a right to restitution, a right to
compensation or a right to punish and deter.
In contrast, transformative remedies modify the legal relations between the parties
existing prior to the litigation. They give rise to legal relations that ‘significantly’ differ from
any legal relation that existed before the court (or other public authority) order was made96.
By their essence, these remedies provide ‘fairly strong’ remedial discretion97, compared to
replicative remedies, for which discretion is limited by the fact that the remedies should
replicate the legal relation existing prior to the infringement of the substantive right. The
scope and nature of the pre-existing substantive right forms the boundary of the discretion.
Yet, the analysis offered stays silent on the possible limits (or not) on the exercise of remedial
discretion by decision-makers for transformative remedies, for which the scope and nature of
the pre-existing substantive right is irrelevant, as by essence their function is to modify them.
For example, if we follow this analysis, what would be the limits of the discretion of the
courts and other decision-makers to impose prophylactic remedies?
Consequently, however clear and useful for descriptive purposes the taxonomy of
remedies in replicative or transformative is, it cannot provide an answer to the question of the
possible boundaries of the remedial discretion of judges and decision-makers. Other options
91 Zakrzewski R., op.cit.
92 Ibid., p. 78.
93 Ibid., p. 80.
94 Ibid., p. 81.
95 Ibid., p. 171.
96 Ibid., p. 203.
97 Ibid., p. 206.
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should be explored, hence the need to analyze the constraints to remedial discretion
emanating from the private or public law nature of the disputes.
3. The limits to remedial discretion set by the nature of private law disputes
(a) Correlativity and corrective justice as central features of private law disputes
According to Ernest Weinrib, ‘correlativity’ constitutes the central feature of private law.
Correlativity perceives the parties’ relationship as a ‘bipolar unit in which each party’s
normative position is intelligible only in the light of the other’s’98. The reason why
correlativity is central to private law is that the private law embodies the concept of
corrective justice. The main function of corrective justice is to preserve entitlements against
wrongful infringement. Yet, claiming Aristotle, Weinrib links the concept of corrective
justice to ‘the relational structure of reasoning in private law’, which ‘conceptualizes the
parties on the active and passive poles of the same injustice (as the doer and the sufferer of
injury)’99.
Corrective justice disqualifies any reasoning inconsistent with the bipolar relational
structure of private law: instrumental considerations, such as distributive justice and
efficiency are excluded from consideration, according to this view, as ‘for although these
may refer to both of the parties, they relate the two parties not to each other but to the goal
that both parties serve’100. The distinction between distributive justice and corrective justice
can be explained by the different emphasis given in each theory of justice. Distributive justice
describes a morally required distribution of shares of resources among members of a given
group, either because of their membership to that group or in accordance with some measure
of entitlement which applies to them in virtue of their membership. This is understood
dynamically, that is across various situations in the specific jurisdiction. Corrective justice
describes a moral obligation of repairing the harm caused to another person: it is thus more
static as it concerns the specific transaction. Rights and duties in distributive justice are
‘agent-general’, while in corrective justice, ‘they are agent-specific.’101
For Weinrib, instrumentalist goals imply considerations ofcollective welfare and thus
‘naturally lead to construing private law not as distinctive moral ordering but as a variety of
public regulation’102. Commentators have emphasized the bipolar relationship between the
98 Weinrib E. J. (2012) Corrective Justice. Oxford: Oxford University Press. p. 2.
99 Ibid., p. 2.
100 Ibid., p. 4.
101 See Perry, S. ’On the Relationship between corrective and distributive justice’, in J. Horder (Ed.) (2000)
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press.; Klimchuk D. (2003) ‘On the Autonomy of
Corrective Justice’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies. 23 49-64.
102 Weinrib, E.J. (2012) The Idea of Private Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  p. 49.
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claimant and the defendant as one of the distinguishing features of private law103. The
centrality of corrective justice also explains why the duty of one party is the mirror image of
the other party’s right. Indeed, ‘only through this bipolarity can the injustice of the causative
event (of the infringement of the right) be a fully adequate reason for a response that links the
defendant to the plaintiff’104. The structure of the remedy should ‘reflect the structure of the
injustice, retracing and reversing the movement between the parties’105. The relation between
the parties as doer and sufferer of the same injustice explains why ‘the parties’ relationship is
mirrored in the structure of the remedial response, for in the absence of the parties’ being
directly linked through the event that causes liability, the law would have no reason to
respond with a remedy that also directly links them’106.
This view relies on the understanding that from the perspective of private law, parties
are regarded ‘solely as persons who interact with each other through their self-determining
capacity to set and pursue their own ends, rather than as subject to obligatory ends set by
personal morality or social goals’107. Indeed, if the law required the parties to act with some
social or moral good in mind, for example the promotion of competition, this goal would
‘mediate the parties’ relationship so that they would be connected not directly to each other
but indirectly through the social good that they and others would share’108. For this reason,
courts constitute the appropriate institutions for the implementation of corrective justice
(Weinrib considers the courts as ‘agents of corrective justice109‘), while distributive justice is
implemented by institutions of the political realm. According to this view, private law and
‘politics’ should be distinguished because of the centrality of corrective justice for the former,
and of distributive justice for the latter. Although both corrective and distributive justice
relate to the allocation of resources, under distributive justice an individual’s entitlements are
not correlative to another individual’s obligations110. Distributive justice aims to answer
questions such as who (as a general category) should have an entitlement, an unrelated issue
to the relative position of a claimant and a defendant in a private law dispute.
In private law disputes losses by the claimants are correlative to gains by the
infringer. Courts may effectively exercise their adjudicatory function to determine, based on
the evidence heard on the structure of the pre-existing relation between the claimant and the
defendant, the appropriate relational structure post-infringement, with the understanding that
103 See, for instance, Lucy, W. (2006) The Philosophy of Private Law, Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp.
433-434.
104 Weinrib, E.J., ‘Two Conceptions of Remedies’ in C. E.R. Rickett (ed.), Justifying Private Law Remedies, op.
cit., p. 4.
105 Ibid., p.5.
106 Ibid. 9.
107 Ibid.
108 Ibid. p. 10.
109 Weinrib, E. (1995) The Idea of Private Law, op. cit. p. 65.
110 Cane, P. (1996) ‘Corrective Justice and Correlativity in Private Law’, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 16
471-488, at 472.
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this should be equivalent to that prior the infringement. Determining the just distribution of
entitlements between different societal groups is nevertheless a role that courts are not
traditionally expected to perform in their adjudicatory function, either because this would
require from them access to evidence and knowledge that would not relate to the relation
between the parties to the dispute (e.g. the distributive impact on other individuals forming
part of the categories to which the plaintiff and the defendant belong) or because it would be
incompatible to the democratic principle and/or the separation of powers, although it is clear
that one cannot entirely exclude that adjudication may produce some polycentric effects111.
Weinrib’saccount of private law has been criticized by other commentators for being
reductionist, and more specifically, for ignoring the centrality of distributive justice concerns
in some areas of private law (e.g. contract law)112. Yet, as Peter Cane observes, this criticism
may be valid for ‘productive or facilitative rules’ only113. The latter should be distinguished
from ‘protective or remedial rules’. They establish a framework within which productive
activities are to be conductive, while remedial rules concern, inter alia, the provision of
remedies and sanctions against unacceptable interference with the entitlement established by
facilitative rules114. It follows that Weinrib’s linkage of corrective justice with private law
adjudication remains undisputed as far as this concerns the conception of remedial rules in
private law.
The court’s or other decision-maker’s discretion is thus bound in the context of
private law resolution of disputes when they impose prophylactic or transformative remedies
by the fact that these should seem to implementing the principle of corrective justice, and
hence should not go beyond the structure of the pre-existing relation between the correlative
entitlements and obligations of the parties to the dispute. A corrective justice theory of
private law adjudication preserves the decision-maker from the risk of discretionary
remedialism.It does not deny the possibility for creative remedies but these should always be
imposed within the strictures of corrective justice. The private law analogy to competition
law is certainly justified in view of the increasing importance of private actions for damages
for competition law infringements and of the need to establish causation between the damage
and the competition law violation
(b) The tension between optimal enforcement theory and corrective justice
111 Fuller, L. and K. I. Winston (1978), ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication’ Harvard Law Review 92(2)
353-409, at 397 & 398 (noting that “concealed polycentric elements are probably present in almost all problems
resolved by adjudication”).
112 Cane, P. (1996) ‘Corrective Justice and Correlativity in Private Law’, op. cit. p. 472.
113 Ibid., p. 475 seq.
114 Ibid., p. 476.
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There is an inherent tension between this view of private law adjudication and that
advanced by the tenants of the optimal deterrence model, which is popular with economists
and more specifically economic analysis of competition law.
The optimal deterrence model and more generally optimal enforcement theory shares
with economic efficiency theory the belief that the aim of the legal system is to promote
wealth maximization. This objective should transcend both the liability and the remedial
stages.115 This duty to act in conformity to the principle of wealth maximization may
potentially confer an important remedial discretion, as it would be possible to impose
remedies that would achieve wealth maximization, without these remedies being necessary
from a corrective justice perspective.116 It is possible to adopt remedies that impose a better,
from a wealth maximization perspective, competitive equilibrium than the one existing prior
to the occurrence of the specific illegal practice, hence modifying the structure of the parties’
pre-existing entitlements to a significant extent. This would be in opposition to the principle
of corrective justice.
For example, the counterfactual to compute damages in case of an exclusionary abuse
of dominant position may be that of a perfect competition or oligopoly equilibrium in which
the competitors of the liable firm obtain profits and set up the investments to properly serve
the market, whereas the situation, prior to the violation was that of a dominant firm with a
competitive fringe equilibrium. In this case, the remedy would have altered the pre-existing
entitlements of the dominant firm and the structure of its relation with the competitive fringe.
In an economic efficiency inspired legal framework for protective rules, it would also
be theoretically possible not to adopt a remedy, if its effect was to jeopardise a new
distribution of entitlements that would be less efficient from the one pre-existing the
violation. Corrective justice would be set aside, if its implementation would have led to
reduce the aggregate total welfare, compared to the situation before the occurrence of the
competition law violation.
Optimal enforcement theory also views remedies as mainly a deterrent device directed
against potential offenders with the view to ensure that the offender (specific deterrence), but
also any other potential offender (general deterrence), would be given sufficient disincentive
to be discouraged to engage in this harmful activity in the future (the optimal deterrence
115 Posner, R.A. (1981) ‘The Concept of Corrective Justice in Recent Theories of Tort Law’, Journal of Legal
Studies. 10, 187-206, 201 (noting that ‘in [the economic theory of law], laws is a means of bringing about an
efficient [in the sense of wealth maximizing] allocation of resources by correcting externalities and other
distortions in the market’s allocation of resources). The idea of rectification in the Aristotelian sense is implicit
in this theory’. For a criticism of this view of the Aristotelian theory of corrective justice, see Shaw, B. & M. W.
Martin (1999) ‘Aristotle and Posner on Corrective Justice: The Tortoise and the Hare’, Business Ethics
Quarterly 9 651-657.
116 It is interesting here to compare the almost unlimited discretion for imposing remedies under this conception
with the limited scope of the liability if ones uses the concept of causation. See Shavell, S. (1980) ‘An Analysis
of Causation and the Scope of Liability in the Law of Torts’ Journal of Legal Studies 9 463-516.
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model).117 Penalties should be sufficient to induce offenders to internalize the full social costs
of their behaviour (the internalization thesis). This assumes that if there is perfect detection
and no social cost of imposing punishment, the optimal sanction will be equal to the net
social (efficiency) loss post violation, compared to the situation prior to the violation.118 The
penalty should thus be equal to the net harm to everyone but the offender.119 For cartels, the
optimal penalty is equal to the deadweight welfare loss plus the wealth transfer to the cartel
from purchasers. This penalty only deters those instances of the offense in which the
deadweight welfare loss exceeds any savings in production costs to the cartel. Accordingly, if
the enforcement costs are positive and the probabilities of detection and punishment are less
than perfect, optimal penalties should, according to the optimal deterrence model, exceed the
social (efficiency) cost of the violation so as to correspond to the efficiency loss caused. The
minimum punishment for deterrence to work will be equal to the expected gain from the
violation (including interest) multiplied by the inverse of the probability of the punishment
being effectively imposed. The idea behind is that the penalty must be sufficient to render the
expected value of the violation equal to zero. By imposing this cost, the offense will be
deterred. The internalization approach limits theoretically the discretion of the authorities to
impose penalties, if it will lead to a less satisfactory, from an efficiency perspective,
equilibrium than that existing prior to the violation.
At the same time, if the aim is to ensure that the offender will be given sufficient
disincentive to be discouraged from engaging in the activity in the future, the expected value
of the violation would be negative (pure deterrence thesis).
In this case, it would make sense to include all possible losses, including those of the
competitor’s of the offender that were, for example, foreclosed from the market, for the long
term effects persisting after the practice has been terminated, or those of upstream suppliers
for lost sales, which, as Hovenkamp observes, are ‘potentially unlimited’ losses.120 Of course,
increased sanctions and excessive penalties may also deter efficient conduct and generate
overinvestment in compliance, which might be inefficient. However, for the tenants of the
pure deterrence thesis, that should not be a major issue, because of the future consequence of
deterring harmful conduct (and therefore its future positive wealth maximization effects).121
Deterrence is also an objective of corrective justice. One could distinguish between
two forms of deterrence: deterrence as wealth maximization and deterrence as a moral
requirement for corrective justice to work effectively. As Gardner forcefully explains, there is
117 The issue is more complicated in competition law (as in all areas of commercial law) as one should also
examine the question of the efficient allocation or mix of deterrence between the corporation and individuals
acting on its behalf.
118 Becker, G.S. (1968) ‘Crime and Punishment: an Economic Approach’, Journal of Political Economy. 76
169-217.
119 Landes, W. M. (1983) ‘Optimal Sanctions for Antitrust Violations’ University of Chicago Law Review. 50
652, 656.
120 Hovenkamp, H. (1989) ‘Antitrust’s Protected Classes’ Michigan Law Review 88 1-48.
121 Wils, W. P. J. (2006) ‘Optimal Antitrust Fines: Theory and Practice’, World Competition 29 183.
31
a distinction to be made between the moral content of corrective justice and the legal
principle of corrective justice:
‘[the legal principle of corrective justice] is supposed to be efficient at securing that
people conform to certain . . . moral norm of corrective justice . . . As well as
correcting torts that have already been committed, this legal principle is apt
systematically to deter the commission of torts that have not yet been committed’.122
Deterrence has a role to play even for those valuing only the moral principle of corrective
justice and rejecting efficiency as a normative value (deterrence-based corrective justice
approach). As with the pure deterrence wealth maximization model, there seems to be few
limits to the discretion of authorities to impose far reaching remedies in this case
Similar problems exist if one adopts a distributive justice account of facilitative rules.
As it was previously noted, corrective justice may be perceived as  action-triggered and
limited in scope to a specific transaction. The remedy is measured in terms only of the
transaction, without regard to the extra-transactional material holdings of the parties123. What
counts as a wrongful loss is not, however, something that is decided by corrective justice.
Corrective justice is just the ‘remedial arm’ of distributive justice.124
As with rights and remedies, the relationship between the two concepts may be put
either in terms of normative priority or independence.125 The priority view conceives that
distributive justice is normatively prior to corrective justice. The consequence is that
corrective justice will be instrumental to distributive justice and its normative character will
derive entirely from it. The duty to repair, therefore, would be granted exclusively on
distributive justice claims. If distributive justice and corrective justice have completely
coextensive domains, then one should reject that corrective justice may limit remedial
discretion for the reason that distributive justice is logically prior, insofar as ‘there must be a
distribution relative to which loss and compensation are measured.’126 As Benson notes,
unless claims of corrective justice are grounded on independent, non-distributive, measures
of entitlement, corrective justice will inevitably collapse to distributive justice.127 However,
as the same author notes,
122 Gardner, J. (2011) ‘What is Tort Law For? Part 1. The Place of Corrective Justice’ Law and Philosophy. 30
1, at 26 & 29.
123 Klimchuck, D. (2003) ‘On the Autonomy of Corrective Justice’ Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 23 49, 52.
124 Id. at 53.
125 Walt, S. (2006) ‘Eliminating Corrective Justice’, Virginia Law Review 92 1311-1323.
126 Alexander, L. A. (1987) ‘Causation and Corrective Justice: Does Tort Law Make Sense?’, Law and
Philosophy. 6 1-23, 7.
127 Benson, P. (1992) ‘The Basis of Corrective Justice and its Relation to Distributive Justice’ Iowa Law Review,
77 515.
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‘what is to preclude the injury party from claiming that the infringement should be
viewed simply as a redistribution of holdings in accordance with the same or a
competing criterion of distribution? If the injury party can coherently frame the
dispute in this way, the correction of the infringement should also properly be
characterized as an act of distributive justice, seeing that it can be viewed as a
decision made between two competing distributive claims’.128
The wrongdoer could claim a different distributive claim, based, for example, on an
alternative distributive measure (the so called Robin Hood defence). The only possibility,
according to the same author, to avoid a counter-claim based on another distributive justice
criterion is to presume that the distribution prior the commitment of the wrong was just and
may thus bar the injuring party from framing the violation ‘in terms of a competing
distributive claim.’129 However, it might be profoundly unjust and arbitrary to confer this
presumption of validity to the pre-transactional allocation rather than to the new
arrangement.130 In conclusion, corrective justice is independent from distributive justice only
if one assumes that the pre-transactional distribution is just. A similar conclusion is reached
by Jules Coleman when he notes that ‘if corrective justice provides moral reasons for
repairing a loss, then the underlying claims sustained by corrective justice must themselves
express requirements of distributive justice […] This relationship appears to rob corrective
justice of its moral independence.’131
This debate is of particular interest for our discussion of discretionary remedialism. If
corrective justice (the remedy) is derivative of distributive justice (determining the
substantive right or the facilitative rule), the assumption being that the pre-transactional
allocation of entitlements is just, then, the remedy cannot go further than restoring the pre-
transactional situation. It cannot modify it to an allegedly superior distributive justice
measure. In other words, the pre-transactional distributive justice entitlement would be the
only measure of the remedy.
In contrast, proponents of the independence view advocate that corrective justice and
distributive justice are normatively independent, in particular if an obligation of repair could
apply without regard to the satisfaction of the demands of distributive justice. Steven Perry
explains:
‘Corrective justice is a general moral principle that is concerned, not with maintaining
a just distribution, but rather with repairing harm. Individuals can be harmed in a
number of different ways, and corrective justice accordingly protects a number of
128 Id. at 530-31.
129 Id. at 531.
130 Id. at 532.
131 Coleman, J. L. (1992) Risks and Wrongs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p. 342.
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different kinds of interest and entitlement. Distributive justice often contributes to the
legitimacy of an entitlement that corrective justice protects, and in that sense there is a
normative connection between the two. But corrective justice does not protect the
entitlement qua distributive share, and its purpose is not to maintain or preserve a
distributive scheme as such. Rather it protects a legitimate entitlement because
interference with the entitlement harms the entitlement-holder. In that sense,
corrective and distributive justice are conceptually independent’.132
This dissociation of corrective justice and distributive justice does not mean that corrective
justice entails no distributive consequences, only that the preservation of distributive claims
does not form part of its purpose. While corrective justice protects legitimate entitlements,
this is because of a duty to repair a harm or wrong based on the principle of corrective justice.
The concept of harm thus dissociates the concept of corrective justice from that of
distributive justice. Perry observes that:
‘(t)he moral focus of the victim’s claim is the harm she has suffered. She is saying:
you harmed me, and therefore you have a moral obligation to compensate me. The
injurer responds with the argument that, distributively speaking, it would be better if
he did not have to pay compensation. At most we have two distinct kinds of moral
claims which must be balanced against one another’.133
The concept of harm responds to the inadequacy, according this view, of applying the
concept of distributive justice to momentary states, for the reason that distributive justice
theories give rise to ‘great deal of indeterminacy’, as they operate through institutions and
over time, that is, according to abstract and long-term patterns.134 In contrast, corrective
justice creates duties to repair that apply at particular moments and is thus normatively
independent of distributive justice. Even if the concept of corrective justice is perceived as
independent from that of distributive justice, the duty to repair is however limited by the
‘harm’ incurred by the injured party. It would not be possible to completely dissociate the
remedy from the liability phase, as it is in the latter one that harm or wrong is defined.
In conclusion, it is only if one adopts a pure deterrence wealth-maximization view or
a deterrence-based corrective justice view that discretionary remedialism would be almost
unlimited. A corrective justice based private law dispute resolution approach reduces the risk
of discretionary remedialism and offers a structured way forward in theorizing about
remedies in competition law.
132 Perry, S. (2000) ’On the Relationship between corrective and distributive justice’, in Horder, Jeremy (Ed.)
Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence. Oxford: Oxford University Press, at 238.
133 Id. at 259.
134 Id. at 246.
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B. A public law account of competition law remedies
1. The specificities of the public law account of remedies
Competition law may be perceived as generating public law duties that are owed to
individuals and thus give rise to corresponding individual entitlements. For example,
according to a certain view of Article 102 TFEU, a dominant firm has a duty (‘a specific
responsibility’) to protect competition135, this duty generating an entitlement for its actual and
potential competitors to have an unrestrained access to the market. Others will replace the
individual entitlement of competitors with an entitlement of consumers or the ‘general public’
to a competitive market process or to competitive market outcomes. In both instances,
competition law imposes to public authorities an obligation to remedy for any breach of this
duty owed to an individual or the general public. Public law aims to regulate the behaviour of
public authorities and ensure that they act legally, that is within the boundaries of the powers
granted to them. Of course, the entitlements generated by these public law duties do not
amount to an entitlement of each individual, if one adopts the first view, or the general
public, if one follows the second view, to require public authorities to act and remedy the
violation of their substantive rights. Public authorities have some discretion, subject to the
rule of law, to exercise their public law conferred powers to act. Instrumental objectives and
priorities (e.g. administrability concerns, efficiency, distributive justice) may impact on their
decision. This is a major difference with the private law dispute resolution mechanism, in
which civil courts have no discretion as to the exercise of their power to provide a remedy to
the dispute between the parties, as this would indeed amount to a denial of justice.
Another important difference between the private and the public law accounts of the
remedial process is that while the former is based on the idea of correlativity, the latter is by
essence polycentric, because of the variety of interests to be considered by the public
authority charged with the protection of the general interest, by essence a polycentric
concept136. The traditional adjudicatory model of private law, designed according to the idea
of correlativity, does not fit with the essence of public law litigation. The latter frequently
entails ‘negotiation, informal dialogue, ex parte communication, broad participation by actors
who are not formally liable for the legal violations, and involvement of court (or public
authority)-appointed officials to assist in the implementation’137, or its ‘forward-looking as
hoc’ character138. As it is noted by Sturm,
135 See, for instance, Case C-395/96 P Compagnie Maritime Belge [2000] ECR I-1365, para. 37.
136 On the polycenticity of public law litigation see, Fuller, L. (1978)  ‘The Forms and Limits of Adjudication,’
Harvard Law Review, 92 353, 395; Sturm, S. P. (1991) ‘A Normative Theory of Public Law Remedies’,
Georgetown Law Journal, 79 1355, at 1385.
137 Sturm, S. P. op. cit., p. 1355.
138 Chayes, A. (1976) ‘The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation’, Harvard Law Review, 89 1981, 1984.
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‘(r)emedial decision-making in public law cases frequently differs dramatically from
the traditional dispute resolution model of adjudication. In the public law context, the
affirmative structural injunction tends to be the remedy of choice, rather than damages
or a negative injunction. Public law cases concern ongoing violations of general
aspirational norms grounded in statutes or the Constitution […]’139.
Furthermore,
‘(i)n public law litigation the judge typically endeavors to develop affirmative
requirements to govern the defendant’s efforts to eliminate the illegal conditions and
practices. Because the judge is seeking to implement generally articulated,
aspirational norms in highly differentiated contexts, liability norms do not dictate the
content of the remedy. Liability norms only provide the goals and boundaries for the
remedial decision’140
Certainly, liability delimits the ‘problems that the remedy must address’ but ‘does not,
however, dictate how those problems should be solved’141. Hence, Susan Sturm notes that
‘(t)he choice of remedy is likely to be driven by goals that do not directly relate to the
liability norm, such as conceptions of good management or the proper goals of
punishment’142. It follows that the court or the authority ‘cannot simply rely upon the
processes used to generate a liability decision’ to formulate a remedy, as the liability stage of
the adjudication does not provide a sufficient amount of factual information (on the different
interests involved in these polycentric disputes) to help the court or the authority to craft the
process and substance of the remedy. The prospective nature of remedial fact-finding in a
polycentric context is also source of additional complications.
The methods of remedial formulation in public law litigation reflect the complexity of
the process and the multiple interests involved. As mentioned earlier, the traditional
adversarial private law process is perceived as inadequate for an appropriate remedial
formulation, in view of its formal and, more importantly, correlative character. The public
remedial process is also more informal (as it may involve some bargaining and negotiation
between the parties and in some cases some initial proposals from the infringer), it aims more
at ‘problem-solving rather than at determining truth and responsibility’143, it involves a more
pro-active role for the judge or public authority in conducting the investigation, as it often
139 P. Sturm, op. cit., p.1361.
140 Ibid., p. 1363.
141 Ibid.
142 Ibid., p. 1364.
143 Ibid., p. 1377.
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involves the participation of interested actors beyond those of the parties to the liability
determination, such as competitors and customers of the competition law infringer other than
the claimant. The competition authority may consult with experts and other outside sources,
as well as appoint third parties (monitoring trustees) to implement the devised remedial plan.
It follows that the remedial discretion from which benefit decision-makers in designing
appropriate remedies is broader than in a private law adjudicatory context. Yet, in the absence
of a proper overarching theory of public remedial process, it is difficult to determine
substantive standards, as opposed to process-centred ones, that would reduce the risk of
discretionary remedialism in this case144.
The linkage between the rights/wrong and remedies presents particular challenges for
decision-makers in a public law setting. In the traditional private law adjudication process,
rights (or wrongs) are ‘linked definitionally and logically’ to remedies, as one of the principal
functions of remedies is to replicate the content of the pre-existing right145. Transformative
remedies also require some form of functional linkage between remedies and rights, the latter
one being an implication of the principles of corrective justice and correlativity in private law
adjudication. Public law process-based approaches, such as structural reform theories,
challenge even further the fit between right (or wrong) and remedy. Sturm explains that ‘the
characteristics of public remedial decision-making preclude the possibility of deducing the
remedy solely from the violation’146, although they do not go as far as to question the
existence, at least, of a ‘loose fit’ between the rights protected and the remedies. In this
context, the linkage between remedies and rights (or wrongs) is instrumental147, as the
liability stage indirectly constraints the targets of the remedial process, whose aim is to
provide a solution to a specifically determined (at the liability stage) problem. The normative
parameters that have been set at the liability stage in the form of problems that the remedy
must address operate at the same time as a guide and as a constraint to the exercise of
remedial discretion in a public law context.
As EU competition law is increasingly marked by the emergence of the economic
approach, the problem to be solved at the remedial stage is not always set in clear and
familiar legal terms. Certainly, the use of legal terminology is still present but the core of the
reasoning defining the problem is performed in economic sprache, at least for the decisions
144 Indeed, both the structural reform process advocated by Fiss, O. (1979) ‘Foreword: The Forms of Justice’,
Harvard Law Review, 93 1 (as an alternative to the traditional adversarial dispute resolution model of Fuller;
see, Fiss, op. cit., p. 2, ‘Structural reform […] is one type of adjudication, distinguished by the constitutional
character of the public values, and even more importantly, by the fact that it involves an encounter between the
judiciary and the state bureaucracies’) and S. Sturm’s project to establish process norms, such as interest
participation, independence and impartiality and reasoned decision-making. Sturm, S. P. (1991) ‘A Normative
Theory of Public Law Remedies’ Georgetown Law Journal, 79 1355, 1390-1403. do not address directly the
question of discretionary remedialism, which is left at the background as a separate issue relating to the
principles of the separation of powers and other normative theories on the role of the judiciary
145 Sturm, S. P., op. cit., p. 1388.
146 Ibid., p. 1389.
147 Fiss, O. op. cit., at 50.
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of the European Commission and NCAs, which increasingly include dense economic
material. As the liability problem is set in economic terms, inevitably the remedial process is
tempted to respond likewise, with the risk that the principle of corrective justice may be
perceived as too much of a straight-jacket to provide an appropriate remedial response, the
principle of economic efficiency offering a better guide. The remedial discretion of the
decision-maker would in this case recognize as its only limits the boundaries of the economic
efficiency concept, thus introducing a conceptual dichotomy in the degree of remedial
discretion in the context of a private law dispute as opposed to a public law one. Yet, even if
one accepts that efficiency will guide the process, it is clear that efficiency involves some
trade-offs that will inevitably be made between different interests affected, so as to define the
most efficient remedial outcome. There is a variety of interests involved: those of the public
for competitive markets, those of the companies to which remedies are imposed for business
freedom, property rights, those of the consumers for lower prices and higher innovation,
those of shareholders for higher pay offs, those of competitors for increased chances to access
the market, those of customers and clients for security of supply and quality inputs, among
others. Some of these interests may be crystallized to legally sanctioned rights, protected by
specific texts of constitutional nature, such as the European Convention on Human Rights or
the EU Charter148 that might be affected by the remedial action of competition authorities. It
is important, however, to note that the EU courts adopt a functional definition of rights and
subject them to limitations for reason of ‘public interest’, thus showing that rights operate
more as ‘trumps’ for certain entitlements or actions rather than as absolute protection devices
that cannot be put aside in presence of powerful or weighty reasons. The development of
trade-off devices of these various interests inevitably emerges from the need to provide
directions to the decision—maker on the appropriate remedial action.
Decision-makers dispose of various trade-off devices in order to perform this search
for appropriate, to the specific circumstances, remedies.
One may adopt a simple means-end rationality test, which will consider if the
remedial means chosen would indeed be a rational means to a purported end. This may
amount to a simple suitability test, which would provide the decision-maker of a lot of
discretion in adopting a remedial package, but with the limitation that the remedies should be
linked rationally with some limited ends. Hence, the test involves a list of limited ends, as it
would make no sense to proceed to an analysis of means without having in mind the ends to
which these means aim.
Another possibility would be to assess the proportionality of the remedial action. This
trade-off device would inquire whether the means are proportionate to the ends. This exercise
will involve in addition to considering if the means chosen are indeed a rational means to a
purported end (step 1 of the test), some assessment of the possible excessive costs of the
148 See, for instance, the right to property or the right to business freedom.
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remedial action in relation to its benefits (step 2) and whether the means chosen are the least
restrictive to the affected interests’ alternative (step 3). The last operation inquires whether
there is a less restrictive (to the affected interests) reasonably available alternative to
accomplish the same remedial end. This test will not amount to a cost benefit analysis, as it
does not necessarily require that the benefits be more important than the costs: the costs may
be more than the benefits but the decision-maker maintains some margin of appreciation to
accept non disproportional differences between costs and benefits in this case.
Finally, we can regroup under the broad category of cost benefit analysis a balancing
test that attempts to measure the costs and benefits of a remedial option or of alternative
remedial options, before choosing the most appropriate one. This trade-off device requires of
course a more intensive fact and evidence-gathering exercise by the decision-maker and the
consideration of the values of the costs and benefits examined.
The type of the trade-off device required depends on the capacity of the institutions in
each jurisdiction to carry the necessary analysis. One would expect a different capacity in a
competition authority than in a court. Yet, EU public law adopts the default trade-off device
of proportionality, which as such imposes constraints to the remedial action and discretion of
competition authorities and courts (through the proportionality test).
2. The principle of proportionality as a constraint to remedial discretion
(a) The substance of the proportionality test
The principle of proportionality constitutes an important limit to the European Commission’s
discretion in imposing remedies149 and demonstrates the necessary logical connection
between the remedy and the liability stages. The principle is included in Article 49(3) of the
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU providing that ‘the severity of penalties must not be
disproportionate to the criminal offence’. Proportionality is also a general principle of EU
law, applying as such to all measures adopted by Community institutions. According to
settled case law,
‘by virtue of that principle, the lawfulness of the prohibition of an economic activity
is subject to the condition that the prohibitory measures are appropriate and necessary
in order to achieve the objectives legitimately pursued by the legislation in question;
when there is a choice between several appropriate measures recourse must be had to
149 See also, Wils W. P. J. (2006), op. cit., at pp.183-208, (noting that ‘‘the principle of proportionality of
penalties reflects the retributive view of punishment. Indeed, the utilitarian conception of punishment, which
justifies fines being set at the level required for optimal deterrence at the lowest cost, competes for the
allegiance of the legal system with the retributive view of punishment. Under the latter view, punishment is not
justified by its future consequence of deterring harmful conduct, but rather on the ground that it is morally
fitting that a person who does wrong should suffer in proportion to his wrongdoing’’).
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the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be disproportionate to the
aims pursued’.150
This three-part test has, of course, to take into account the margin of discretion of the
European Commission in adopting appropriate remedies. In that sense, proportionality differs
from a cost-benefit analysis which would focus only on the gravity of harm and the
alternative remedies that might have been imposed. The remedy will be disproportional when
its costs and burdens outweigh its likely benefit of restoring competition or when its costs
would be more important than an alternative remedy which would have also been equally
effective. Proportionality may take into account other issues, such as the degree of judicial
deference to the Commission’s decision, as ‘the appropriateness of and the need for the
contested decision must be assessed in relation to the aim pursued by the institution.’151
Although the principle of remedial proportionality does not exist as such in US antitrust law,
a constitutional proportionality requirement applies to most punitive damages cases as well as
to other types of remedies.152
(b) The remedial proportionality test in the context of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU
It is explicitly provided in Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 that the Commission may impose
on undertakings any behavioral or structural remedies which are proportionate to the
infringement committed and necessary to bring the infringement effectively to an end. This
provision mainly codifies previous case law of the CJEU relying on Article 3(1) of
Regulation 17/62 that the remedies imposed should ‘not exceed what is appropriate’ and
should be ‘necessary to attain the objective sought, namely [to restore] compliance with the
rules infringed’153.  There is a preference for structural remedies, only if there is no equally
effective behavioral remedy or where any equally effective behavioral remedy would be more
burdensome for the undertaking concerned, as otherwise the remedy might be
disproportional.
150 Case C-331/88, The Queen v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food and Secretary of State for Health,
ex parte: Fedesa and others [1990] ECR I-4023, para. 13.
151 Case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission, op. cit., para. 99.
152 Thomas, T.A. (2007) ‘Proportionality and the Supreme Court’s Jurisprudence of Remedies’ Hastings Law
Journal 59 73; Sullivan, T. E. and R. S. Frase (2008) Proportionality Principles in American Law: Controlling
Excessive Government Actions. Oxford: Oxford University Press. See also, State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v.
Campbell et al., 538 U.S. 408 (2003) where the US Supreme Court has declined to adopt a strict ratio test for
punitive damages, but has suggested that the punitive to actual ratio should rarely be in double digits (i.e.,
exceed a 9-1 ratio).
153 See Case T-170/06, Alrosa Co. Ltd v. Commission [2007] ECR II-2601, para. 102; Case T-338/94,
Finnboard [1998] ECR II-1617, para. 242; Case T-76/89, RTE and ITP v. Commission [1991] ECR Ii-757, para.
93; Case T-7/93 Langnese-Iglo v. Commission [1995] ECR II-1533, para. 209; Case T-9/93 Schöller v.
Commission [1995] ECR II-1611, para. 163.
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The principle of proportionality is given a specific content in Article 7 of Regulation
1/2003 and in the competition law case law of the European courts.154 It requires that
‘measures adopted by Community institutions do not exceed the limits of what is
appropriate and necessary in order to attain the legitimate objectives pursued by the
legislation in question; when there is a choice between several appropriate measures,
recourse must be had to the least onerous, and the disadvantages caused must not be
disproportionate to the aims pursued’.155
The first step of the proportionality principle is of particular interest for our purposes.
It may indeed be advanced that the appropriate and necessary character of the remedies to be
imposed would require a precise remedial measurement, not only with regard to the
magnitude and scope (amount) of the harm to consumers/competition or the nature of the
infringement, but also in relation to the type of violation that was identified. This might cover
a specific competition law category (ie a refusal to deal, a tying case, an exclusive dealing
case),156 but a simple descriptive statistical analysis of the remedies imposed by the European
Commission in abuse of dominant cases from the beginning of EU competition law to 2010,
shows that remedies are not always confined to the type of abuse that has been previously
identified.
(Table 2)
More important in an economically-oriented competition law is the fit between the remedy
and the theory of harm advanced in the specific case (ie maintenance of monopoly,
leveraging, essential facilities).
The importance of remedial fit is often stressed by antitrust law literature.157 It is also
indirectly linked with the existence of a causal relation between the undertaking’s conduct
and the theory of harm advanced, which has, as the DC Circuit held in the US Microsoft case
‘more purchase in connection with the appropriate remedy issue.’158 Remedies should of
154 Case T-260/94, Air Inter v. Commission [1997] ECR II-997; Case T-65/98, Van den Bergh Foods v.
Commission [2003] ECR II-4653, para. 201; Case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission, para. 98.
155 Opinion of Advocate general Kokkott in Case C-441/07 P, para. 46.
156 On the importance of categorization in the context of Article 82 EC, see Lianos, I. (2009) ‘Categorical
Thinking in Competition Law and the ‘Effects-based’ Approach in Article 82 EC’, in A. Ezrachi (Ed.) Article
82 EC: Reflections on Its Recent Evolution. Oxford: Hart Publishing Press.
157 See Barnett, T.O. (2009) ‘Section 2 Remedies: What to do after catching the Tiger by the Tail’ Antitrust Law
Journal, 76 31, 36 (‘the remedy needs to be tied closely to the anticompetitive conduct occasioning it. That
means that remedies need to be sufficient, but not overbroad, and proportional to the offense’); Werden, G.J.
(2009) ‘Remedies for Exclusionary Conduct Should Protect and Preserve the Competitive Process’, Antitrust
Law Journal, 76 65, p. 65., ‘[r]emedies for exclusionary conduct should arise ‘organically out of the theory of
the case’’ (citing Sullivan, L.A. (1977) Handbook of the Law of Antitrust. St. Paul, Minn. West Publishing Co.,
p. 146).
158 Microsoft, 253 F.3d at 80.
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course be effective. They aim ‘to re-establish the competitive situation, i.e., the competitive
process that would have prevailed but for the infringement.’159 However, if the principle of
proportionality requires a close fit between the harm and the remedy, determining the nature
of that fit (functional, instrumental) is crucial as to the possibility of adopting prophylactic
remedies.
(i) The linkage between the remedy and the competition law violation
The case law of the EU courts is clear as to the necessary linkage between the remedies and
the competition law infringement.
First, the scope of the obligations imposed on the undertakings concerned in order to
bring the infringements to an end identified should be implemented according to the nature of
the infringement declared and the obligations imposed ‘must not exceed what is appropriate
and necessary to attain the objective sought, namely re-establishment of compliance with the
rules infringed’160. This relates to the obligation of the Commission to give the undertakings
concerned the opportunity of being heard on the matters to which it has taken objection. For
example, the Commission is not entitled to impose a fine on an undertaking without having
previously informed it in the statement of objections that it intended to do so, a requirement
which applies by analogy also to remedies161. The existence of a competition law violation
(even if there is no explicit finding of an infringement) ‘constitutes the basis of the obligation
of the parties to terminate the infringement’, hence the reason for imposing remedies162.
In Atlantic Container the CJEU annulled part of the Commission’s decision for
having imposed to the parties to the infringement to renegotiate or terminate the service
contracts concluded between the shippers and the maritime conference, which were not found
to be illegal under Article 101 TFEU (as only the provisions of the TAA relating to price-
fixing and capacity were found by the Commission to infringe this provision)163. The
Commission had adopted this requirement of re-negotiation or termination as a prophylactic
remedy in order to prevent the members of a cartel to continue to apply unlawfully fixed
prices simply because these prices were incorporated in long-term contracts with the idea to
159 Hellström, P., F. Maier-Rigaud & F. W. Bulst, (2009) ‘Remedies in European Antitrust Law’, Antitrust Law
Journal 76 43, 58.
160 Case T-76/89, Independent Television Publications Ltd v Commission [1991] ECR II-575, para. 93; Case C-
279/95P Langnese-Iglo v Commission [1998] ECR I-5609, para. 74
161 Case T-395/94, Atlantic Container Line AB [2002] ECR II-875, para. 417; Case 322/81 Michelin v
Commission [1983] ECR 3461, para. 20
162 Joined cases 56 & 58/64, Consten & Grundig, [1966] ECR 299, at 338; Joined cases T-125 and 127/97, Coca
Cola [2000] ECR II-1733, para. 80 (observing that ‘where an undertaking is in a dominant position it is obliged,
where appropriate, to modify its conduct accordingly so as not to impair effective competition on the market
regardless of whether the Commission has adopted a decision to that effect’).
163 Case T-395/94, Atlantic Container Line AB [2002] ECR II-875, para 398 seq. Service contracts are
agreements under which the shipper undertakes to ship a minimum volume or value of cargo during the period
of the contract and in return, the carrier undertakes to provide to the shipper specific service guarantees, such as
a capacity guarantee, and negotiates a price lower than that which is normally applicable.
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ensure compliance with the Commission’s decision, in other words, the requirement to
renegotiate or terminate the service contracts was justified by the fact that the effects of the
infringements identified in the decision would have continued to exist if the addressees of
that decision were able to continue to enjoy the economic advantages secured by ongoing
contracts entered into on the basis of the horizontal agreement to fix prices and limit supply
found illegal by the Commission.164.
As this part of the decision formed part of the order bringing the infringement to an
end, there was no need to give specific reasons or to draw it to the attention of the parties
concerned in the statement of objections165. The Court did not agree with this view, noting
that most horizontal agreements to fix prices or divide up a market have such effects, more or
less long-term, on third parties, but the Commission does not usually include comparable
broader obligations in its decisions declaring an infringement166. Furthermore, the Court
noted that the likelihood of private actions for damages should be a sufficient disincentive for
the defendants to continue behaviour that would have maintained or facilitated the effects of
the core infringement to Article 101 TFEU, and in any case, the Commission had the
obligation to ‘explain its reasoning’ as to how the prophylactic measures suggested were
‘obviously necessary’ to put the main infringement to an end, something that the
Commission’s decision had not done.167 Finally, the Court observed that ‘the statement of
objections should in any event have set out, even briefly, but in sufficiently clear terms, the
measures which the Commission intended to take in order to bring an end to the
infringements and should have given the applicants all the information necessary in order to
enable them properly to defend themselves before the Commission adopted a final decision
on that point’, in view of the rights of defence of the defendants and the requirement that they
should be offered a proper opportunity to make known their view168.
In a number of cases, the Commission required the undertakings concerned by its
infringement decision to refrain in the future from any conduct which may have a same or
similar effect to those covered by the infringement decision, with the aim to prevent the
undertakings from repeating the behaviour found to be unlawful169. In Cartonboard, the
Commission prohibited any future exchange of commercial information by which the
participants directly or indirectly obtain commercial information on competitors, even if this
was not by its nature unlawful under Article 101 TFEU as the information related also to
certain aggregated statistical data170. The General Court found that such prohibition exceeded
164 Ibid., para. 406.
165 Ibid., para. 407.
166 Ibid., para. 413.
167 Ibid., paras 414-415.
168 Ibid., paras 418-419.
169 Case T-310/94, Gruber & Weber GmbH & Co KG, [1998] ECR II-1043, para. 167; Case T83/91, Tetra Pak
[1994] ECR II-755, para. 220 (‘its aim is to put an end to all the practices found unlawful in the Decision and to
preclude any similar practice’).
170 Case T-310/94, op. cit., para. 177.
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what was necessary in order to bring the conduct in question into line with what was lawful
because it was seeking to prevent the exchange of purely statistical information which was
not in, or capable of being put into, the form of individual information and thus used for anti-
competitive purposes. Indeed, the Commission had not considered the exchange of statistical
data to be in itself an infringement of Article 101(1) TFEU. According to the Court, ‘the mere
fact that a system for the exchange of statistical information might be used for
anticompetitive purposes does not make it contrary to Article [101(1) TFEU], since in such
circumstances it is necessary to establish its actual anti-competitive effect’171.
In Langnese-Iglo, the General Court observed that Article 101 TFEU confers on the
Commission ‘only the power to prohibit existing exclusive agreements which are
incompatible with the competition rules’172, thus rejecting the attempt by the Commission to
impose a prophylactic prohibition of concluding future exclusive purchasing agreements. The
Court justified its position by noting that
‘it would be contrary to the principle of equal treatment, one of the fundamental
principles of Community law, to exclude for certain undertakings the benefit of a
block exemption regulation as regards the future whilst other undertakings, such as
the intervener in this case, could continue to conclude exclusive purchasing
agreements such as those prohibited by the decision. Such a prohibition would
therefore be liable to undermine the economic freedom of certain undertakings and
create distortions of competition on the market, contrary to the objectives of the
Treaty’173.
The Court of Justice held on appeal that the General Court’s position was consistent
with its case-law requiring that the obligation to terminate the infringement applied according
to the nature of the infringement found, noting also that ‘the principle of legal certainty
requires that every act of the administration which produces legal effects should be clear and
precise so that the person concerned may know without ambiguity what are his rights and
obligations and may take steps accordingly’ 174.
Interim measures are also subject to similar constraints with regard to the linkage of
the remedy with the competition law wrong identified. In Ford Werke the Commission had
imposed interim measures requiring Ford AG to deliver to its German distributors right-hand
drive cars, following the finding that Ford AG had infringed Article 101 TFEU by adopting a
circular to its selective distribution network dealers that it would no longer accept their orders
for right-hand drive cars. The CJEU was seized as to the legality of these interim measures, in
171 Ibid., para. 178.
172 Case T-7/93, Langnese-Iglo GmbH v. Commission, [1995] ECR II-1533, para. 205.
173 Ibid., para 209.
174 Case C-279/95 P, Langnese-Iglo GmbH v Commission, [1998] ECR I-5609, para. 78.
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view of the fact that the refusal by Ford to satisfy the demand of its German dealers for right-
hand drive cars was a unilateral practice, which was included in the scope of Article 101 only
as long as it related to the application of an existing dealer agreement between Ford AG and
its distributors. The applicants argued that by reversing this unilateral practice, the interim
measures of the Commission went beyond the powers granted to it to bring the infringement
(here the agreement between Ford AG and its dealers) to an end.
The Court held that the Commission may adopt as interim measures those which
appear indispensable in order to prevent the Commission’s decision ‘to become ineffectual or
even illusory’ because of the action of the undertakings175. However, this power includes the
possibility to adopt prophylactic remedies as long as this is ‘solely’ in relation to the
competition law infringement176. Yet, the contested interim measure did not relate to the
agreement between Ford and the dealers but ‘solely’ to Ford’s refusal to supply right hand-
drive cars to German dealers. The refusal did not infringe either articles 101 or 102 TFEU,
hence it did not come ‘within the framework’ of the final Commission’s decision177. The
Court further noted that even if the requirement imposed by the Commission to supply right-
hand drive cars was considered in the context of Article 101(3) TFEU, as conditioning an
exemption to the prohibition of Article 101(1) TFEU, the Commission ‘would still have no
authority to convert that requirement, by means of a decision ordering interim measures, into
a separate enforceable order which leaves no choice to the undertaking concerned’178. It is
only in case the discontinuation of supplies formed part of a principal infringement that the
Commission may impose a remedy requiring the undertakings concerned to continue to
supply179.
(ii) Freedom of contract as a limit to remedial discretion
The boundaries set to the Commission’s remedial discretion may also be limited by
the freedom of contract, should the remedy impose a duty to conclude contractual relations
with a party.
In Automec, the General Court held that ‘since freedom of contract must remain the
rule’, the Commission ‘cannot in principle be considered to have among the powers to issue
orders which it has for the purpose of bringing to an end infringements to article [101(1)
TFEU] the power to order an undertaking to enter into contractual relations, since in general
175 Joined cases 228 & 229/82, Ford of Europe Incorporated and Ford-Werke Aktiengesellschaft v Commission
[1984] ECR 1129, para. 19
176 Ibid., para. 20.
177 Ibid., para. 21.
178 Ibid., para. 22.
179 See, for instance, the position of the General Court in case T-23/90, Peugeot, [1991] ECR II-653, paras. 55-
56. For an interesting analysis see, Sofianatos, G.A. (2009) Injonctions et Engagements en Droit de la
Concurrence, Paris : LGDJ, pp. 266-267.
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it has appropriate means at its disposal for requiring an undertaking to terminate an
infringement’180. It is reminded here that although the remedy of nullity is provided for by
article 101(2) TFEU, all other civil consequences of an infringement of this Article (and
consequently also of article 102 TFEU), such as damages or the possible obligation to enter
into a contract, are to be determined by national law181. Yet, for the General Court, it cannot
be held to be any justification for such a restriction on freedom of contract where there are
several ways of bringing an infringement to an end. For example, infringements relating to
vertical restraints in a distribution system can also be eliminated by the abandonment or the
amendment of the specific rules of the distribution system. Hence, although the Commission
undoubtedly has the power to find that an infringement exists and to order the undertakings
concerned to bring it to an end, it cannot impose upon them its own choice from among all
the various potential courses of action which are in conformity with the Treaty182. The
submissions of the Commission in this case seem also to indicate that the remedy cannot go
so far as to compel a supplier to accept a particular dealer within his distribution system, such
remedy involving an intuitu personae relation between two parties183. Requiring admission to
a selective distribution system does not however amount to imposing an intuitu personae
relation, as the dealer should in any case fulfil the objective and qualitative requirements for
the admission to the network, the same way other dealers do184.
In Alrosa, the General Court held that compliance with the principle of
proportionality requires that, when there are less onerous measures than those the
Commission suggests to make binding, and these are known, the Commission should
examine whether those measures are capable of addressing the concerns which justify its
action before it adopts, in the event of their proving unsuitable, the more onerous approach.185
The Commission cannot prohibit ‘absolutely any future trade relations between two
undertakings unless such a decision is necessary to re-establish the situation which existed
prior to the infringement.’186 It is only in ‘exceptional circumstances’, such as ‘where the
undertakings concerned have a collective dominant position,’ that the Commission may
prohibit undertakings completely and indefinitely from contracting amongst each other.187
The Court found that, in the absence of these exceptional circumstances, the Commission’s
decision to require from undertakings to refrain for an indefinite period from all direct or
indirect trading relations between them, infringes the principle of proportionality.
180 Case T-24/90, Automec Srl v Commission, [1992] ECR II-2223, para. 51.
181 Ibid., para. 50.
182 Ibid.
183 Ibid., para. 45.
184 See, Sofianatos, G.A. (2009) Injonctions et Engagements en Droit de la Concurrence, op. cit., p. 268.
185 Case T-170/06, Case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission [2007] ECR II-2601, para. 131.
186 Id. at para. 103.
187 Id. at para. 141.
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(c) The prospective nature of remedial assessment as a limit to the proportionality test
Although in Alrosa the CJEU has struck down the judgment of the General Court188 for
having applied the same level of proportionality control to Article 9 and to Article 7
decisions189, the analysis by the General Court of the content of the proportionality test
remains still relevant for Article 7 purposes (as far as it assumed that, for the General Court,
the proportionality test was similar for both types of decisions). In this case, the General
Court examined the proportionality of the commitments accepted by the Commission.
Considering the possible evolution of this market in the future, the Commission was of the
view that imposing a termination to the contractual relation between the two parties was
clearly necessary in order to allow third parties to have access to Alrosa’s output and to allow
Alrosa to compete fully with De Beers.190 The General Court was not convinced by the
prospective analysis of the evolution of the market performed by the Commission to which it
substituted its own.
The judgment of the General Court was set aside by the CJEU, mainly for applying the
same standard of proportionality to Article 7 and 9 decisions191. Interpreted as such, the
judgment of the CJEU may be limited to Article 9 decisions, thus not denying to the General
Court the possibility to subject Article 7 decisions to a strict proportionality test. However,
there is also some language in the CJEU’s judgment that might constrain the ability of the
General Court to perform a thorough analysis of the substantive proportionality of the remedy
and its fit to the liability theory advanced: the General Court should in no case put forward its
own assessment of complex economic circumstances and should not substitute its own
assessment for that of the Commission.192
The Commission’s analysis of the fit between the theory of anticompetitive effects, as it
was determined in the stage of establishing the existence of a competition law wrong, and the
remedy imposed in order to redress this problem, remains therefore outside the scope of
judicial scrutiny (and the application of the proportionality principle) so long as the fit
between the remedy and the problem is predominately analyzed from an economic
perspective requiring a ‘complex economic assessment’.
The case law has consistently recognized the Commission’s discretion as to ‘complex
economic and technical assessments’, over which the Courts only exercise a limited review
for a ‘manifest error’ of appreciation193. In Alrosa Advocate General Kokkott went as far as
188 Case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission [2007] ECR II-2601, paras. 105–6; Appeal Case C-441/07 P.
189 Case C-441/07, European Commission v. Alrosa Company Ltd. [June 29, 2010], nyr.
190 Id. at para. 145 (referring to point 70 of the statement of objections sent by the Commission).
191 See, our analysis infra.
192 Case C-441/07, European Commission v. Alrosa Company Ltd. [29 June 2010], nyr, para. 67.
193 Case 42/84, Remia [1985] ECR 2545, para 34; Joined Cases 142/84 & 156/84, BAT and Reynolds v.
Commission [1987] ECR 4487, para. 62; Case C-7/95, John Deere v. Commission [1998] ECR I-3111, para. 41,
noting that ‘(d)etermination of the effects of an agreement on competition constitutes a complex economic
appraisal ‘.
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indicating that the ‘crucial factor’ limiting the General Court’s scrutiny over the margin of
assessment of the Commission in the context of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 was not due
to the voluntary character of the commitments but to the fact that under Article 9 the
Commission must carry out an assessment of the market situation in which the commitments
offered are embedded. It must examine
‘what effects those commitments will have on future market activities and whether the
alternatives known to it are equally appropriate for addressing the competition
problem identified. This alone [emphasis added] requires an appraisal of complex
economic matters […] The fact therefore remains that in the present case the
Commission enjoyed and also utilized a margin of assessment’194.
It was the prospective nature of the analysis undertaken by the Commission under Article
9 of Regulation 1/2003, involving the assessment of the shape future market activities will
take in the light of the commitments. That brings the commitment decisions of Regulation
1/2003 closer to commitment decisions in merger control, which, as we will explore in the
next section, are subject to a lower degree of judicial scrutiny, hence a wider discretion is
recognized to the Commission’s remedial action. Commitment decisions under Article 9 and
merger control share the need for a ‘future-oriented prospective economic analysis’ of the
expected effects of the commitments offered by the parties, the fact that these emanate from
existing practices or projected ones, being irrelevant for this purpose195. In view of this wider
discretionary space, the Commission is not required to identify alternative, less restrictive to
the parties, solutions to the commitments offered to it196. If the Commission was required to
do so, such analysis will be deemed equivalent to performing a complex economic
assessment (as ‘the Commission is called to give a decision in the nature of a forecast’), and
thus not subject, for the same reasons, to judicial scrutiny under the principle of
proportionality. At the price of a tautological and formalistic argument, Advocate General
Kokott, followed by the Court, excludes from judicial scrutiny under the principle of
proportionality an important part of the remedial activity of the Commission.
The Commission may therefore enjoy a wide remedial discretion by being able to find
cover behind the nebulous and still undetermined concept of complex economic assessment,
and thus avoid a strict proportionality control of its remedial action, not only in the context of
Article 9 but also for Article 7 decisions that impose prophylactic remedies following some
prospective economic assessment of the effects of the infringement in the future. The
recourse to more economic or effects-based analysis in the implementation of Articles 101
and 102 TFEU and the fact that EU competition law can apply even if the allegedly
194 Opinion of AG Kokott, Case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa Company Ltd [2010] ECR II-5949, para. 74.
195 Ibid., para. 71.
196 Ibid., para. 73.
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anticompetitive practice does not produce any actual anticompetitive effects, but may
increase the likelihood of (potential) anticompetitive effects197, may produce the perverse
effect of reducing the scope of the proportionality principle, limiting the extent of judicial
scrutiny of the Commission’s remedial action and thus increasing the likelihood of
discretionary remedialism.
(d) The remedial proportionality test in the context of EU merger control
(i) The principle of proportionality in merger control
The principle of proportionality is explicitly mentioned in Regulation 139/2004 on EU
merger control198. It is reminded that in EU merger control, remedies are suggested by the
parties and may be accepted by the Commission as a condition for a declaration of
compatibility of the merger to Regulation 139/2004. In this area, the Commission has
proceeded to a self-limitation of its margin of discretion (by effect of the principle of
legitimate expectations)  by adopting a detailed Notice on merger remedies where it provides
guidance to the undertakings concerned on the appropriate modifications to concentrations
suggested in their commitments proposed to the Commission. These modifications may be
implemented in advance of a clearance decision or following a clearance decision.
Implementing a well-established case law of the European courts199, the Commission notes in
the Remedies Notice that it ‘is not in a position to impose unilaterally any conditions to an
authorisation decision, but only on the basis of the parties’ commitments’200. However, if the
parties do not validly suggest remedies adequate to address the competition concerns, the
Commission has as only option to adopt a prohibition decision. It is further explained in the
Notice that ‘the commitments have to eliminate the competition concerns entirely and have to
be comprehensive and effective from all points of view’201. The requirement that
commitments should eliminate all the competition concerns derives from the case law of the
General Court and may extend the ability of the Commission to accept remedies that may
seem in some circumstances disproportionate to the identified competition concerns.
197 On the standard of proof for anticompetitive effects see, Lianos, I. & C. Genakos, Econometric Evidence in
EU competition law: An Empirical and Theoretical analysis, Chapter in this volume.
198 Regulation 139/2004, recital 30 (‘commitments should be proportionate to the competition problem and
entirely eliminate it’). Indeed, as it is stated in recital 6, ‘this Regulation does not go beyond what is necessary in
order to achieve the objective of ensuring that competition in the common market is not distorted, in accordance
with the principle of an open market economy with free competition’.
199 Case T-210/01, General Electric v. Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para. 52; Case T-87/05, EDP v.
Commission [2005] ECR II-3745, para. 105.
200 Commission Notice on remedies 2008, op. cit., para. 2.
201 Commission Notice on remedies 2008, op. cit., para. 9. See also, Case T-210/01, General Electric v.
Commission [2005] ECR II-5575, para. 52; Case T-87/05, EDP v. Commission [2005] ECR II-3745, para. 105.
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For example, in Cementbouw the Court noted that ‘the parties’ commitments must not
only be proportionate to the competition problem identified by the Commission in its
decision but must eliminate it entirely’, concluding that ‘the notifying parties are not required
to confine themselves to proposing commitments aimed strictly at restoring the competition
situation existing before the concentration’202.
The voluntary character of the commitments, and the fact that the Commission has no
discretion in rejecting the commitments offered by the parties and in imposing unilaterally
remedies aimed strictly at restoring the situation preceding the concentration may explain the
weaker nexus required between the merger remedies to the competition concerns identified
than in antitrust cases. Yet, the crucial factor is not the unilateral or voluntary character of the
remedies but the different aim of merger control, in comparison to the aim of the ex post
control of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. In merger control, the aim is not just to restore the
pre-existing competitive equilibrium but to ‘ensure competitive market structures’203.
Following the 2004 revision of the merger regulation and the new substantive test a
‘competitive market structure’ is not only defined in opposition to a dominant position, which
should be eradicated, but to a structure that is not characterized by a significant impediment
of effective competition, a much broader in scope category. It follows that the Commission
may decide to accept commitments that go beyond the pre-merger market configuration, in
other words, remedies that presumably establish a market equilibrium that is more
competitive than the pre-merger one.
This is a distinct possibility in coordinated effects cases. Nicholas Petit distinguishes
between three types of remedies approved in coordinated effects cases: ‘type 1’ remedies,
such as a divestiture, that create or restore ‘competitive forces external to the oligopoly’,
which restore ‘- albeit in a different form - the pre-merger market structure’, ‘type II’
remedies that seek to ‘sever structural links within the oligopoly’ and thus to ‘eradicate
collaborative opportunities between incumbent oligopolists’, and finally, ‘type III’ remedies
that aim at eliminating ‘facilitating practices’ that increase the likelihood of collusion204.
Parties may be obliged to offer clear-cut type I remedies, when negotiating with the
Commission, although less intrusive type II or type III remedies which could have achieved
the same competitive outcomes are also available. For example, the parties may offer a
remedy preventing the risks of tacit collusion post-merger by focusing only on one of the four
conditions of the substantive standards devised by the EU Court in Airtours plc v.
Commission for establishing coordinated effects205, and not be obliged to offer a wider panel
of remedies that would have acted on all them206.
202 Case T-282/02, Cementbouw Handel & Industrie BV v. Commission, [2006] ECR II-319, paras 307-308.
203 Commission’s Remedies Notice 2008, op. cit., para. 15. See also,
204 Petit, N. (2010) ‘Remedies for Coordinated Effects under the European Union Merger Regulation’,
Competition Law International 6 (2), 8-9.
205 Case T-324/99, Airtours plc v Commission of the European Communities [2002] ECR II-2585.
206 Petit, N. (2010), op. cit., p. 9.
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By subjecting the Commission to general principles, the Merger Notice limits its
remedial discretion. According to the Notice, the Commission should review ‘whether the
commitments submitted by the parties are proportionate to the competition problem when
assessing whether to attach them as conditions or obligations to its final decision’207. Yet, the
language used in the Notice remains vague and the multi-factor approach employed in order
to determine the appropriateness of different types of remedies leaves an important margin of
discretion to the Commission. In assessing whether the proposed commitment will likely
eliminate the competitive concerns identified, the Notice provides that the Commission will
‘consider all relevant factors relating to the proposed remedy itself, including inter alia, the
type and scope of the remedy proposed, judged by reference to the structure and particular
characteristics of the market in which the competition concerns arise, including the position
of the parties and other players on the market’208. Implementation concerns and the ability to
monitor commitments should also influence the selection of appropriate commitments, thus
introducing some additional factors to take into account than the simple elimination of
competition concerns.
(ii) The distinction between structural/behavioural remedies in merger control
The typology of remedies explored by the Commission, as it is also the case for any
other competition authority in the world209, is directly inspired by the opposition between
structural and behavioural remedies. Structural remedies, such as divestiture, aim to create or
preserve legally and operationally independent firms so as to maintain competition in the
affected market. Behavioural or conduct remedies subject firms to operating rules intended to
prevent them from undermining competition210. The distinction is not clear-cut and some
remedies may present characteristics of both categories: for example, a remedy of
compulsory patent licensing may be considered as a form of divestiture of the firm’s
intangible property rights. The EU Courts have been critical to a strict dichotomy in the
past211.
207 Merger Notice 2008, op. cit., para. 85.
208 Ibid., para. 12.
209 For instance see, UK Competition Commission, Merger Remedies: Competition Commission Guidelines
(November 2008), p. 12.
210 Kwoka, J. E. & D. L. Moss (2011) ‘Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for Antitrust
Enforcement’ (American Antitrust Institute, November 2011), available at
http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/~antitrust/sites/default/files/AAI_wp_behavioral%20remedies_final.pdf , pp. 3-
5, accessed October 15th, 2012.
211 Case T-102/96, Gencor v. Commission [1999] ECR II-753, para. 319, (‘The categorisation of a proposed
commitment as behavioural or structural is [...] immaterial’, the Court preferring to examine on a case-by-case
basis the commitments offered by the undertakings concerned).
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The simplicity of divestitures, as they do not require once implemented a specific
monitoring mechanism, has been duly remarked212. An additional reason for the Commission
to prefer structural commitments, as opposed to behavioural ones, is that structural
commitments prevent, durably, the competition concerns raised by the merger213. In any case,
the Commission acknowledges that ‘the question of whether a remedy and, more specifically,
which type of remedy is suitable to eliminate the competition concerns identified, has to be
examined on a case-by-case basis’214. Case by case approach notwithstanding, the Notice
expresses, however, a clear preference for divestiture-related remedies in general, noting that
they ‘are the benchmark for other remedies in terms of effectiveness and efficiency’ and that
the Commission may accept other types of commitments, ‘but only in circumstances where
the other remedy proposed is at least equivalent in its effects to a divestiture’215. There are
cases where this would rarely be so: for example, the Commission considers that divestiture
commitments are the best way to eliminate competition concerns resulting from horizontal
overlaps, problems resulting from vertical or conglomerate concerns216, or for removing links
between the parties and competitors in cases where these links contribute to the competition
concerns217. In contrast, the Commission appears more cautious with regard to other
prophylactic remedies, such as commitments relating to the future behaviour of the merged
entity, which can only be accepted in exceptional circumstances.
This preference for structural remedies in mergers may be contrasted to the generally
more favourable position of Regulation 1/2003 on the ex post control of Articles 101 and 102
TFEU for behavioural remedies218 and to the more positive approach towards behavioural
remedies in the recent US DOJ 2011 Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies
(hereinafter, 2011 US Remedies Guidance)219. The approach of the DOJ to merger remedies
212 Merger Notice 2008, op. cit., para. 13. For an interesting analysis of the alleged advantages of structural
remedies see, Papandropoulos, P. and A. Tajana (2006)  ‘The Merger Remedies Study – In Divestiture We
Trust?’, European Competition Law Review 8, 443.
213 Merger Notice 2008, op. cit., para. 15.
214 Ibid., para. 16.
215 Ibid., para. 61.
216 Ibid., para. 17.
217 Ibid., para. 58.
218 See, Article 7(1) Regulation 1/2003 indicating that ‘Structural remedies can only be imposed either where
there is no equally effective behavioural remedy or where any equally effective behavioural remedy would be
more burdensome for the undertaking concerned than the structural remedy. See also, Hellström, P., F. Maier-
Rigaud & F. W. Bulst, (2009) ‘Remedies in European Antitrust Law’, op. cit.
219 Department of Justice, Antitrust Division Policy Guide to Merger Remedies (June 2011).  This text replaced
a previous Guidance issued in 2004. In the United States, the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice
and the Federal Trade Commission have different procedures for achieving final approval of a suggested merger
remedy. The DOJ must file suit in a federal court to block or otherwise to challenge a merger. When the parties
and the DOJ agree to a remedy, the Antitrust division must file a proposed consent decree embodying the
remedy to the relevant court. The court must determine if the proposed settlement is in the public interest based
on the competitive impact assessment prepared by the Antitrust Division, a judicial scrutiny that is more
intensive after the passage of the 2004 Tunney Act amendments. The Court must consider the relationship
between the remedy and the specific competition harm alleged, whether the decree may cause harm to third
parties, whether the relief is adequate, alternative remedies considered by the DOJ Antitrust Division, without,
however, engaging in ‘an unrestrained evaluation of what relief would best serve the public’: OECD, Remedies
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seems to have shifted, with behavioural/conduct remedies being preferred for vertical cases
while structural remedies for horizontal cases220. Furthermore, the new Guidance has added a
number of behavioural remedies to the existing arsenal of the DOJ, such as firewalls,
transparency or non-discrimination provisions, mandatory licensing, anti-retaliation,
arbitration requirements. It is possible that conduct remedies may transform themselves to a
form of economic regulation. In addition, they are generally subject to important
implementation and monitoring costs221.
However, the effectiveness of structural remedies has been recently challenged222,
some authors suggesting that the economics of regulation may provide clear principles for the
design of appropriate behavioural/conduct remedies, thus improving their effectiveness and
lowering their costs223. The ex ante character and the prospective nature of merger control
increase, nevertheless, the risk for both types of remedies to over-fix the competition problem
identified224, which raises the issue of the proportionality of remedies. The 2004 US
Remedies Guidance is clear as to the purpose of merger remedies, which is ‘not to enhance
pre-merger competition but to restore it’ or to maintain it at the pre-merger levels225. Yet, the
in Merger cases, op. cit., p. 229. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) can also ask a court to block the merger
but may also use its proper administrative procedures to settle the case. After the parties reach agreement as to
the settlement with the FTC’s staff, the FTC votes to accept the agreement without this requiring any approval
by the courts, the FTC being a quasi-judicial administrative agency. Parties may appeal any resulting order to
final appellate review by the federal courts of appeal. Private actions against mergers are also possible. In theory
all antitrust remedies (injunctions, divestiture, damages) are available (Section 4 Clayton Act), although
damages awards are rare. See Hovenkamp, H. (1984) ‘Merger Actions for Damages’, Hastings Law Journal 35
937.
220 2011 Merger Remedies, op. cit., p. 2.
221 Kwoka, J.E. & D. L. Moss, (2011) ‘Behavioral Merger Remedies: Evaluation and Implications for Antitrust’.
op. cit.
222 See, for instance, European Commission, DG Competition, Merger Remedy Study (October 2005), available
at http://ec.europa.eu/competition/mergers/legislation/remedies_study.pdf US Federal Trade Commission, A
Study of the Commission’s Divestiture Process (1999)Available at
http://www.ftc.gov/os/1999/08/divestiture.pdf
223 Rey, P. (2003) ‘Economic Analysis and the Choice of Remedies’, in F. Lévêque & H. Shelanski (Eds.)
Merger Remedies in American and European Union Competition Law. Cheltenham, UK and Northhampton,
MA, US: Edward Elgar.
224 On the risks of over-fixing and type I errors (pro-competitive mergers blocked or modified by the authority),
see Duso, T, D. Neven & L.H. Röller, (2003) ‘The Political Economy of European Merger Control: Evidence
Using Stock Market Data’, CEPR Discussion Paper DP 3880, available at
http://www.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/6/6607/papers/neven.pdf ; Duso, T., K. Gugler & B. Yurtoglu (2007) ‘EU
Merger Remedies: A Preliminary Empirical Assessment’ in Vivek Ghosal & John.Stennek (Eds), The Political
Economy of Antitrust (Contributions to Economic Analysis) Amsterdam: Elsevier. Pp. 302-348.
225 2004 US DOJ Merger Remedies, p. 2; United States E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 366 U.S. 316, 326
(1961); See also, the US contribution to the OECD, Remedies in Merger Cases (Policy Roundtables, 2011),
available at http://www.oecd.org/daf/competition/RemediesinMergerCases2011.pdf p. 222, (noting certain basic
principles the US agencies apply to all their merger remedies. First, effectively preserving (or restoring)
competition is the key to an appropriate merger remedy. […] Second, the Agencies’ central goal is preserving
competition, not determining market outcomes. […] Third, a remedy closely tailored to the theory of the
violation in a particular case is the best way to ensure that the relief obtained cures the competitive harm. The
Agencies will accept a proposed remedy only if they are satisfied that there is a close, logical nexus between the
proposed remedy and the alleged violation—that the remedy fits the violation and flows from the theory of
competitive harm.’); ICN Recommended Practices for Merger Analysis, available at
http://www.internationalcompetitionnetwork.org/uploads/library/doc316.pdf , p. 2.
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judicial scrutiny of the remedies included in the consent decrees of the DOJ and the FTC is in
practice limited: first, the courts have refrained from assessing the merits of the government
decision to settle the case, such decision being held outside the scope of judicial review, and
have also exercised self-restraint of attempting to assess the competitive merits of one form
of relief or another226; second, with regard to the content of the consent decree, the US Courts
do not examine if it is the best possible decree but only exercise some limited judicial
scrutiny in order to guarantee that the consent decree meets the public interest test227, despite
legislative efforts to deepen the degree of judicial involvement by defining more precisely the
content of the ‘competitive impact’ of the remedy in the context of the ‘public interest
test’228.
(iii) A limited judicial scrutiny of remedial discretion in EU merger control
The judicial review of remedial discretion in the context of EU merger control is also limited.
First, the General Court has recognized to the Commission a ‘broad discretion in assessing
the necessity of obtaining commitments in order to dispel the serious doubts raised by a
notified concentration’229. The General Court cannot substitute its own assessment for that of
the Commission, but its review must be limited to ascertaining that the Commission has not
committed a manifest error of assessment. A failure to take into account commitments
suggested by the parties or the fact that other commitments might have been accepted or even
might have been more favourable to competition, ‘does not by itself prove that the contested
decision is vitiated by a manifest error of assessment’230. Second, although the Commission
has no discretion as to the initiation of a phase II procedure, once ‘serious doubts’ with
respect to the compatibility of the concentration with the common market are identified,
Article 6(1)(c) employing the prescriptive ‘shall’, the Commission nevertheless enjoys a
certain margin of discretion in identifying and evaluating the circumstances of the case in
order to determine whether the phase I commitments are sufficient to dissipate these
concerns. The Court explains: ‘as the notion of ‘serious doubts’ is an objective one, the
identification of such doubts necessarily requires the Commission to carry out complex
economic assessments, in particular where it must assess whether the commitments proposed
226 Areeda, Philip and Herbert Hovenkamp, (1978) An Analysis of Antitrust Principles and their Application.
Aspen Publishing., 3D, ¶ 327, pp. 25-37.
227 See, for instance, US v. Microsoft, 56 F.3d, at 1457-1458 (D.C. Cir. 1995), the Court noting that ‘Congress
did not mean for a district judge to construct his own hypothetical case and then evaluate the decree against that
case’ (ibid., at 1461).
228 See, for instance, the 1984 amendments to Section 5 of the Clayton Act and the subsequent 2004
amendments of the Tunney Act. See 15 U.S.C. § 16(e), observing that the competitive impact includes the
termination of the alleged violations, provisions for enforcement and modification, the duration of the relief
sought, anticipated effects of alternative remedies actually considered.
229 Case T-158/00, Arbeitsgemeinschaft der öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunkanstalten der Bundesrepublik
Deutschland (ARD) v Commission, [2003] ECR II-3825, para. 328.
230 Ibid, para 329. See also, T-177/04, EasyJet Airline Co. Ltd v Commission, [2006] ECR II-1931, para. 128.
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by the parties to the concentration are sufficient to dispel those serious doubts’231.  The
judicial scrutiny is that of a manifest error of assessment232. However, the Court takes into
account the specific purpose of the commitments entered into during the Phase I procedure
‘which, contrary to the commitments entered into during the Phase II procedure, are not
intended to prevent the creation or strengthening of a dominant position but, rather, to dispel
any serious doubts in that regard’ and requires that ‘the commitments entered into during the
Phase I procedure must constitute a direct and sufficient response capable of clearly
dispelling all serious doubts’, thus reinforcing the degree of judicial scrutiny exercised233.
The extent of the judicial scrutiny of the General Court on the content of the merger
remedy is further limited by the doctrine of ‘complex economic assessments’, which requires
from the Court to subject the Commission’s appraisal to a limited legality control, the
Commission maintaining a large margin of discretion. As the General Court explained in
EDP, review by the EU courts must in this case be ‘limited to ensuring compliance with the
rules of procedure and the statement of reasons, as well as the substantive accuracy of the
facts, the absence of manifest errors of assessment and any misuse of power’234. The extent of
the judicial control of the proportionality of the remedy will by essence be limited, in view of
the nature of the control of legality235.
The self-restraint that EU Courts must exercise in the context of a limited control of
legality may be opposed to the more aggressive judicial scrutiny of the proportionality of
fines. There are two important differences with regard to the institutional context of other
remedies in EU antitrust and merger law. First, the principle of proportionality takes an
arithmetic form in Article 23(2) of the Regulation, which provides that the Commission can
impose fines on undertakings that may not exceed 10 per cent of its total turnover in the
preceding business year. This somehow arbitrary threshold constitutes an attempt by the
legislator to draw a rough balance between the anticompetitive harm and the harm to the
undertaking’s financial position, according to the principle of proportionality and provide the
courts with some rough measure of what is manifestly disproportionate. The Commission
maintains of course its margin of discretion for imposing fines below this threshold. In
addition, in fixing the amount of the fine, the EU Courts require from the Commission to pay
231 Case T-119/02, Royal Philips Electronics NV v Commission [2003] ECR I-1433, para. 77.
232 Ibid., para. 78.
233 Ibid., paras 79-80. See also, T-177/04, EasyJet Airline Co. Ltd v Commission, [2006] ECR II-1931, para.
129.
234 Case T-87/05, EDP – Energias de Portugal, SA v. C [2005] ECR II-3745, paras 63 & 151.
235 See, for instance, the Opinion of AG Kokott, in Case C-441/07 P, Alrosa, op. cit., para. 88, noting that by
examining if there was an alternative solution that would have reduced the risks of distortion of competition
than the remedies suggested by the parties, the General Court left ‘the realms of a review of the lawfulness of a
Commission decision and in reality carrie[d] out its own appraisal of complex economic matters’ (emphasis
added). That would be contrary to the nature of the legality review (which is not a review over the comparative
cost benefit analysis of the different remedies that can be imposed to restore competition), the latter involving a
‘thorough analysis of market conditions, for which the [General Court] is not competent, however, but the
Commission’.
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due regard to both to the gravity and to the duration of the infringement as well as to the
effect on the market of the competition law infringement.236 These constraints to the
Commission’s discretion were included in its Guidelines onsetting fines, along with other
procedural requirements and may bind the Commission in view of the principle of legitimate
expectations237. Second, the Commission’s decisions on fines are not subject to the limited
control of legality, as other remedies. Following the interplay of Article 261 TFEU and of
Article 31 of Regulation 1/2003, the judicial control of the appropriateness of the amounts of
fines is more intensive, the Commission’s assessment being examined beyond the existence
of a manifest error of assessment. Pursuant to these provisions, the General Court is endowed
with unlimited jurisdiction to assess the appropriateness of fines, and if necessary, may vary,
downward or upward, the amount of the fine imposed by the Commission. In its most recent
case law, the Court of Justice prescribed rigorous standards for the judicial scrutiny of the
Commission’s decisions. In particular, the Court held that ‘the Courts cannot use the
Commission's margin of discretion - either as regards the choice of factors taken into account
in the application of the criteria mentioned in the Guidelines (of the Commission) or as
regards the assessment of those factors - as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-
depth review of the law and of the facts’.238 Despite this recent language for a more intensive
judicial involvement in the consideration of the amount of fines, the judicial scrutiny
exercised remains that of a control of legality, with all the inherent limitations this type of
judicial scrutiny entails239.
But are the nature of the judicial control (control of legality as opposed to review on
merits) and that of the proportionality principle the main sources of the relatively weak
judicial control exercised over competition law remedies? Is the proportionality principle
flexible enough to accommodate the need for a more intensive judicial control of competition
law remedies? Is there any difference with regard to the degree of interference of the courts to
the remedial action of competition authorities in the context of a merits review? In order to
examine these questions, we will refer to the experience gained from the enforcement of
competition law in the UK.
236 See Joined Cases C-189/02 P, C-202 P, C-205-208/02 P, C-213/02 P, Dansk Rørindustry and others [2005]
ECR I-5425, para. 243.
237 Commission’s Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of Regulation
No 1/2003, [2006] OJ C 210/2.
238 See, Case C-368/10 P, Chalkor AE Epexergasias Metallon v European Commission, December 8, 2011, not
yet published, para. 62. See also, Case C-389/10 P, KME Germany AG, KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v.
European Commission,  December 8, 2011, not yet officially published; Case C-272/09 P, KME Germany AG,
KME France SAS and KME Italy SpA v. European Commission, December 8, 2011, not yet published.
239 It is interesting to note that in a recent judgment the EFTA Court held that ‘when imposing fines for
infringement of the competition rules, [the EFTA Surveillance Authority] cannot be regarded to have any
margin of discretion in the assessment of complex economic matters which goes beyond the leeway that
necessarily flows from the limitations inherent in the system of legality review’: Case E-15/10, Poste Norge AS
v. EFTA Surveillance Authority [April 18, 2012], not yet published, para. 100
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(e) Does a full merits review make a difference as to the margin of remedial discretion?
The UK competition law system stipulates two forms of judicial control of the competition
authorities’ action. First, the remedies adopted by the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) with
regard to the application of Articles 101, 102 and their national equivalents (Chapter I and II
of the Competition Act 1998) are subject to a full merits (appellate) review in front of a
specialised Tribunal, the Competition Appeal Tribunal (CAT)240. The process is close to a
quasi-adversarial model, where the decisions of the OFT are subject to strict and intensive
scrutiny in law, facts and policy, the CAT having the authority to substitute its assessment to
that of the authority. However, appeals against a decision by the OFT to release or not to
release commitments given to it in the course of a competition investigation are not subject to
appeal but to judicial review241.
Second, merger control remedies and remedies in the context of market investigation
references, adopted by the UK Competition Commission (CoCo) (or the OFT during the first
phase of the proceedings with regard to the decision to refer the merger to the Competition
Commission or to clear the merger) are subject to the traditional control of legality (judicial
review) of administrative action, in front of the specialised CAT as well as in front of the
High Court. Yet, despite this important institutional dichotomy between competition law
remedies in the ex post antitrust control (Chapter I, Chapter II, articles 101 and 102 TFEU)
and competition law remedies in the context of the ex ante competition law control (mergers,
market investigation references), the intensity of judicial control exercised over remedies is
particularly strong, in comparison to the situation in the EU. This may be explained by the
fact that this is performed by the same judge (the CAT).
There are three grounds of review which are commonly used: illegality, procedural
impropriety and irrationality. The threshold usually applied for irrationality is the
unreasonableness Wednesbury standard according to which, ‘if a decision on a competent
matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the
courts can interfere […] but to prove a case of that kind would require something
overwhelming’, which sets a quite high standard of proof for the plaintiff’242. However, the
240 The Tribunal was established by the Enterprise Act 2002 (Section 12 and Schedule 2). The CAT does not
have inherent jurisdiction as the High Court (whose jurisdiction is established by precedent) but a statutory
jurisdiction, its standards of review being based on statutory law. Section 46(1) and (2) of the Competition Act
1998 provide that any party to an agreement in respect of which the OFT has made a decision, or any person in
respect of whose conduct the OFT has made a decision, may appeal to the CAT ‘against, or with respect to, the
decision’. Such decisions may also be made by the various sector specific regulators pursuant to the competition
jurisdictions they hold concurrently with the OFT. Schedule 8 provides for two different types of review
depending on the type of decision under appeal. In most cases, according to paragraph 3(1) of the Schedule, the
CAT ‘must determine the appeal on the merits by reference to the grounds of appeal set out in the notice of
appeal’.
241 Paragraph 3(1) does not apply to an appeal under s.46 against, or with respect to, a decision of the kind
specified in subsection (3)(g) or (h) of that section, or to an appeal under s.47(1)(b) or (c). See also, Schedule 8,
paragraph 3A.
242 Lord Greene Associated Provincial Picture Houses Ltd v Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223, HL
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threshold is a lower one, that of proportionality, when European Union law or Human Rights
Act breaches are involved243. It is well established that the level of scrutiny to which the
Courts will subject an administrative decision depends ‘upon the subject matter in hand’244,
the test being that of ‘heightened scrutiny’ for human rights cases245. The boundaries of the
judicial review as opposed to a merits review are well set in the case law: according to the
CAT, the exercise of judicial review should be contrasted with an appeal ‘on the merits’ […]
(as) judicial review proceedings are solely concerned with the lawfulness of a decision and
not its correctness’246. The CAT has no jurisdiction to cure an error and the merits of the
administrative action are only subject to political control. The nature of the judge, specialised
or not, should not make any difference as to the intensity of review, as the scope of the
judicial review is defined in terms if the extent of power and the legality of its exercise, rather
than in terms of the protection of individual or the public interest247. However, some
commentators have rightly observed that ‘it is inevitable that the CAT’s approach to the
application of judicial review principles will be to some extent informed by its expertise and
its experience as an appellate tribunal conducting merits appeals’, and inferred that ‘the CAT
is likely to delve deeper into a regulator’s reasoning and to have a better appreciation of any
defects in it than an Administrative Court judge to whom merits are anathema and who may
have little or no experience of complex regulatory disputes’ 248. The CAT is also more
inclined to use cross-examination than traditional Administrative Courts249.
The case law of administrative courts generally shows deference to administrative
action and accords important weight to the decision-makers when they have discretion. The
Court examines the rationality of the regulator’s action, but it is not asked to form its own
view on the part of the material available to the decision-maker250. When performing their
243 There has been a lot of discussion on the relation between the rationality (reasonableness) standard and the
proportionality standard, some authors suggesting that there is a clear opposition between the two, the rational ity
standard applying to public wrongs, while the proportionality standard in cases involving rights, while some
others advanced a unitary framework based on the proportionality standard. In practice, the difference of
opinion represents merely an issue of branding of the type of control exercised as both sides seem to agree on
the fact that there is a sliding scale in the intensity of judicial review exercised by the Courts (the ‘rainbow of
review’).
244 R (Mahmood) v Home Secretary [2001] 1 WLR 840 at §18.
245 see R v Ministry of Defence, Ex p Smith [1996] QB 517, 554.
246 See, Merger Action Group v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2008] CAT
36, para. 60.
247 For a clear statement see, Barclays Bank plc v. Competition Commission [2009] CAT 27, para. 27, ‘In the
Tesco case this Tribunal summarized its task as to ascertain whether the Commission had done what was
necessary to put itself in a position properly to decide its statutory questions. In the BSkyB case, the tribunal
emphasized […] that the specialist composition of the Tribunal, with members well qualified to form their own
views as to the correct methods of economic analysis, did not permit any departure from settled principles of
judicial review, so as for example to permit it to substitute its own views as to the correct evaluation
methodology, or as to the depth of analysis required, for those of the Commission’.
248 See the excellent analysis by Dinah Rose QC & Tom Richards, Appeal and Review in the Competition
Appeal Tribunal and High Court, Blackstone Chambers, p. 12.
249 Ibid.
250 R (Fraser) v National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence [2009] EWHC 452
(Admin) at §47 per Simon J.
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task of judicial review, the Courts are inspired by the EU theory on complex economic
assessments, by taking a deferent approach to the economic appreciations of the competition
authorities251. The weight (and thus the degree of deference) provided to the decision of the
competition authority is commensurate with the prospective nature of economic analysis:
‘because the likelihood of error is greater in a prospective analysis, the prospective analysis
must be proportionately more rigorous to account for this possibility’252. Yet, judicial review
does not amount to rubber-stamping of decisions already made by the competition
authorities, the CAT proceeding to a sort of cost benefit analysis of the remedy253.
In BAA Limited v. Competition Commission, although the CAT explained that the
proportionality test does not require a precise quantitative analysis of the impact of the
remedy, as the first step of a cost benefit analysis that will compare the adverse effects on
competition with the costs of implementing the remedy and its impact on the undertakings254,
it held that some qualitative analysis of the costs of implementation and the impact of the
remedy, in comparison to the AEC, should be performed in order to establish the link
between the remedy and the wrong, thus limiting the remedial discretion of the CoCo.
In a full merits (appeal) review, the CAT proceeds to extensive findings of fact in
cases where the evidence relied on by the OFT is challenged, very often on the basis of
extensive new material introduced by the appellant and rebuttal evidence introduced by the
OFT255. However, the Tribunal exercises an appellate function and cannot proceed to the
same analysis of the factual record as a court (or a regulator) would do at first instance. The
fact that it is an (appellate) review (and not a review de novo), limits the factual record that
the Court disposes to that submitted by the parties and examined by the authority256. Hence,
251 See, R v. Director General of Telecommunications, ex p Cellcom [1999] ECC 314, ‘(w)here the Act has
conferred the decision-making function on the Director, it is for him, and him alone, to consider the economic
arguments, weigh the compelling considerations and arrive at a judgment […] If (as I have stated) the court
should be very slow to impugn decisions of fact made by an expert and experienced decision-maker, it must
surely be even slower to impugn his educated prophesies and predictions for the future’.
252 Hutchison 3G (UK) Ltd v Office of Communications [2005] CAT 39, para. 33.
253 See, Tesco Plc v. Competition Commission, [2009] CAT 6 (The CAT required the UK Competition
Commission (CoCo) to perform a ‘double proportionality’ test, balancing the ‘(achievable) aims of the proposed
measure on the one side, and any adverse effects it may produce on the other side’, taking however into account
‘the wide margin of appreciation’ that the CoCo disposes on these matters and the need for a court to be
cautious in interfering with these balancing exercises in an application for judicial review’); Barclays Bank Plc
v. Competition Commission [2009] CAT 27, para. 19 & 21 (the CAT noted that ‘double proportionality’ is not a
new legal principle but simply a convenient label for the common sense proposition that, within a wide margin
of appreciation, the depth and sophistication of analysis called for in relation to any particular relevant aspect of
the inquiry needs to be tailored to the importance or gravity of the issue within the general context of the
Commission’s task. The proportionality test performed was defined as a ‘balancing exercise required between
effectiveness, reasonableness and practicability’.
254 BAA Limited v. Competition Commission [2009] CAT 35, para. 261.
255 M.E. Burgess, J.J. Burgess & S.J. Burgess v. OFT, [2005] CAT 25, para. 130.
256 See, Freeserve v Director General of Telecommunications [2003] CAT 5, paras 110-111 ‘[…] in our view
this Tribunal is essentially an appellate tribunal, not a tribunal of first instance. In complainants’ appeals (as
distinct, for example, from appeals against penalties) it seems to us that the primary task of the Tribunal will
usually be to decide whether, on the material put before him by the complainant, the Director was correct in
arriving at the conclusion that he did. If it turns out, in the course of the appeal, that the Director was
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some weight will still be provided to the analysis performed by the relevant competition
authority at first instance257. As some commentators have explained, ‘when the decision
under challenge is a multi-faceted policy decision, the CAT is more likely to allow the
legitimate judgment of the regulator to stand, unless it can be shown that there is some error
in the basis for that judgment’258.
In contrast to judicial review or the ordinary approach of an appeal court, the CAT is,
however, willing in an appeal review to determine disputes of primary fact and proceeds
more frequently than other appeal courts to cross-examinations of witnesses259. This might
seem, at first sight, to blur the distinction between an appeal process and an examination of
the facts of the case at first instance. The appeal process certainly involves the rehearing of a
case but the content of such rehearing is something that depends on a variety of factors.
Writing in the context of an appeal process to the decision of a court at first instance, Mary
L.J. noted that
‘(t)he review will engage the merits of the appeal. It will accord appropriate respect to
the decision of the lower court. Appropriate respect will be tempered by the nature of
the lower court and its decision making process. There will also be a spectrum of
appropriate respect depending on the nature of the decision of the lower court which
is challenged. At one end of the spectrum will be decisions of primary fact reached
after an evaluation of oral evidence where credibility is in issue and purely
discretionary decisions. Further along the spectrum will be multi-factorial decisions
often dependent on inferences and an analysis of documentary material’260.
Re-hearing in appeal does not amount to a rehearing ‘in the fullest sense of the word’,
as the Court should ‘not normally interfere with the exercise of a discretion unless the
decision of the lower [authority] was reached on wrong principles or was otherwise plainly
wrong’.261 Hence, ‘in so far as rehearing [...] may have something of a range of meaning at
the lesser end of the range it merges with that of [judicial] ‘review’, as, ‘at this margin,
attributing one label or the other is a semantic exercise which does not answer such questions
insufficiently informed, in our view the appropriate course will usually be for the Tribunal to remit, rather than
to attempt to investigate the merits for the first time’.
257 Albion Water Limited v Water Services Regulation Authority [2008] CAT 31, paras 70 & 72: ‘the Tribunal
will, whilst still carrying out an assessment of the merits of the case, give due weight to a finding which is
arrived at by an appropriate and reliable methodology, even if a dissatisfied party could suggest other ways of
approaching the issue which would also have been reasonable and which might have resulted in a resolution
more favourable to its case’.
258 Dinah R. QC & T. Richards, Appeal and Review in the Competition Appeal Tribunal and High Court,
Blackstone Chambers, op. cit. p. 19.
259 Ibid.
260 Dupont de Nemours v Dupont [2003] EWCA Civ 1368, para. 94 cited by D. Rose QC & T. Richards, Appeal
and Review in the Competition Appeal Tribunal and High Court, Blackstone Chambers, op.cit. p.20.
261 Ibid., paras 96-97.
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of substance as arise in any appeal’262. As the CAT has clearly explained in M.E. Burgess,
‘(i)n deciding whether to take its own decision, the Tribunal is mindful of the fact that it is an
appellate tribunal from an administrative decision and should not therefore turn itself into the
primary decision-maker without good reason’ 263. There is a perceptible tension between this
and the fact that ‘the Tribunal’s jurisdiction is a merits jurisdiction, and thus wider than a
judicial review jurisdiction’264.
It follows that some margin of appreciation may also persist in the context of an
appellate review process, depending on the exact position of the specific category of the
decision in the ‘spectrum of appropriate respect’ from which benefit the decision-maker at
first instance. ‘Multi-factorial’ decisions or decisions ‘dependent on inferences and an
analysis of documentary material’ (thus involving a wide margin of interpretative choices and
important sources of information or methodological and epistemic competence) require in
general more respect for the choices made by the competition authority than its decisions
over primary facts. Moreover, in the presence of a specialised tribunal, which has by essence
the epistemic and methodological competence to assess the way these inferences were made,
the margin of discretion recognized at the competition authority should be lower in
comparison to where the rehearing is done by a generalist court without direct access to that
epistemic and methodological competence265. It remains, however, that some sources of
information from which usually benefit a competition authority (e.g. over the specific
economic sector or other close sectors that might be affected) would be unavailable to the
court, specialised or generalist, in view of the fact that even in an appellate review process the
court can only evaluate the contending arguments submitted by the parties, in which case
some residual degree of discretion would always be maintained by the competition authority.
Albion Water offers an excellent example of the degree of intrusion of the appellate
judge to the remedial action of a competition authority. In Albion, the OFWAT (the sector
specific regulator enforcing competition law under the concurrent jurisdiction powers) had
not found an infringement of the EU and UK competition law provisions on the abuse of a
dominant position266. The CAT reversed the OFWAT’s decision finding that Dŵr Cymru
abused its dominant position by offering an access price for common carriage of non-potable
water via its system (the ‘First Access Price’), which imposed a margin squeeze and was
262 Ibid., para. 98.
263 M.E. Burgess, J.J. Burgess & S.J. Burgess v. OFT, [2005] CAT 25, para. 129.
264 Floe Telecomm v Office of Communications [2005] CAT 14, para. 65, ‘It is our intention that the tribunal
should be primarily concerned with the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions contained in the appealed
decision and not with how the decision was reached or the reasoning expressed in it. That will apply unless
defects in how the decision was reached or the reasoning make it impracticable for the tribunal fairly to
determine the correctness or otherwise of the conclusions or of any directions contained in the decision.
Wherever possible, we want the tribunal to decide a case on the facts before it, even where there has been a
procedural error, and to avoid remitting the case to the [competition authority]’.
265 In the context of the UK civil procedure, it is rare that generalist courts appoint assessors or for the parties to
appoint single party experts.
266 OFWAT, CA98/01/2004, May 26, 2004), Albion Water Limited v. Dwr Cymru Cyfyngedig.
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excessive and unfair in itself267. It is interesting here to note that in its full review of the
OFWAT’s decision on the merits, the CAT assessed the validity of the ECPR (Efficient
Component Pricing Rule) methodology used by the OFWAT, thus illustrating that
methodology issues are not immune from strict scrutiny and do not form part of the margin of
appreciation recognized to the competition authorities, as in judicial review proceedings. In
the absence of a settlement between the parties on all outstanding matters, the CAT
proceeded to a judgment on remedies, the UK legislation providing it in the context of a full
merits review with the same powers as a competition authority to bring an infringement to an
end. This power involved the possibility for the CAT to order that the infringing undertaking
refrains from measures ‘having an equivalent effect’ to those found to have been abusive, as
long as these measures do not affect legal certainty, that is, they are sufficiently precise for
their scope to be determinable268.
The broad powers recognized raise nevertheless questions as to the limits to which the
remedial action of the CAT is subject to in a full merits review. The CAT, as any court,
should confine itself to deciding what is necessary for the adjudication of the actual dispute
between the parties and may not decide more than is necessary269. It follows, that exercising
an adjudicatory function in the context of a dispute, the CAT is inherently limited in its
ability to impose complex and information demanding remedies. As it is noted by the CAT,
‘there are considerable practical difficulties for courts (or indeed competition authorities) in
crafting a remedy’ that would involve as it was asked by Albion in this case, the setting of a
minimum retail margin270. As it is noted by the CAT, the problem is faced also by
competition authorities in their adjudicatory function. The following excerpts from the CAT’s
judgment introduce an inherent boundary of competition law remedies: the fact that they are
not and cannot be regulatory remedies.
‘How can the Tribunal [or a competition authority] determine this margin without
examining costs and demands, indeed without acting as a price-setting regulator, the
determinations of which often last for several years (and are themselves subject to
appeals)? […] (H)ow the Tribunal, or the Authority, should respond when costs or
demands change over time, as inevitably they will. The efficient margin fixed today
may, through economic and business changes, become the inefficient margin of
tomorrow. We do not say that these questions are unanswerable, but we have said
enough to show why courts [or competition authorities] normally avoid direct price
administration, relying on more appropriate methods’271.
267 Albion Water Limited v. Water Services Regulation Authority, [2006] CAT 23; [2006] CAT 36; [2008] CAT
31 (on unfair pricing).
268 Ibid., para. 39.
269 Ibid., para. 4.
270 Ibid., para. 55 (emphasis added).
271 Ibid.
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(f) The limits of remedial discretion in the public law account of remedies
In conclusion, the public law perspective on remedies does not give more ground to the
doctrine of discretionary remedialism than the private law account. First, the proportionality
principle will operate so as to limit the discretion of the competition authorities. The way
proportionality is assessed may provide more or less leeway to the remedial action of the
competition authority, but in general its margin of appreciation is subject to scrutiny. Second,
as it has been illustrated, despite the differences between the control of legality and the full
merits review, the CAT proceeds to a strict scrutiny of the remedies imposed by the UK
competition authorities, thus showing that the type of judicial control is not the most
important variable in the possible limitations to the remedial discretion of competition
authorities and that in rough edges the constraint exercised on their remedial powers may be
functionally equivalent. Consequently, the fact that in the EU the control is limited to the
legality of the remedy should not make a difference as to the existence of limits to the
authorities’ remedial powers. But does the fact that the CAT is a specialized court make any
analogy with the EU Courts ineffective? Would a specialized EU Court acting in a full merits
review have full remedial discretion? The answer to this question is also in the negative.
Competition authorities and courts, even specialized ones, are limited by their adjudicatory
function in the type of remedies they are able to craft: these cannot be regulatory in nature
and lead a complex, from an economic perspective, information devouring and long-term
assessment of the situation in hand. Having in mind these inherent limitations of the process
of remedial action from a public law perspective, we summarize in the following section the
factors limiting the risk of discretionary remedialism from both the private and the public law
accounts of remedies.
C. The degree of remedial discretion: a mixed public and private law account
By providing analysis of the powers of remedial action from a public and a private law
perspective, the two previous sections illustrated the normative impossibility of discretionary
remedialism in competition law. Whichever theory one chooses to put forward, the remedial
discretion of the competition authorities and courts hits a conceptual boundary, either set by
the private or by the public law conception of ‘remedies’.
There are strong objections to an approach of discretionary remedialism that would
conceive the primary or secondary rights protected as being conceptually distinct from the
remedies that would address the violation of that right, whichever remedial aim is finally
chosen: restorative, punitive, preventive. A remedy that would go beyond simply ‘mirroring
the abuse’ in an abuse of dominant case and which would provide the infringer's competitors
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an advantage over the infringer in order to restore the competitive process may be justified
only in very limited circumstances: those requiring the intervention of transformative or
prophylactic remedies. However, even in these cases, the remedy should be connected
logically with the wrong that it aims to address. This requirements stems from the principle of
correlativity and corrective justice in the private law account of remedies, and that of
proportionality in the public law account. Even if one takes a cost benefit analysis approach,
focusing on economic efficiency (e.g. the remedy should improve the situation in comparison
to that prevailing pre-remedies), the remedial discretion will be limited, first by the operation
of the cost benefit analysis (as the costs of the remedy for the parties subject to it should not
outweigh the benefits of the remedy), and second by the nature of the adjudicative function,
as courts and authorities are limited in their ability to address a number of issues and to craft
complex and far reaching remedies. Their ability to delegate the enforcement task to third
parties is also restricted in the antitrust context.
Courts and competition authorities are also subject to institutional constraints as to the
remedies selected. Courts cannot impose fines, rarely use injunctions but they can generally
award damages (although punitive damages are not practically available). Competition
authorities in Europe can impose injunctions, fines but not damages or the disgorgement of
illicitly gained profits. Some remedies are subject to a statutory limit (e.g. fines that cannot be
higher than 10% of the turnover of the undertaking concerned, injunctions in the ex post
competition law enforcement cannot be disproportional), while others are more intrinsically
linked to the array of the competition law wrong (e.g. damages).
The degree of judicial oversight also affects the remedial discretion of competition
authorities and courts at first instance. The remedial action of the authorities may be subject
to a limited control of legality (for injunctions involving complex economic appraisals), a
more reinforced one (in the context of merger control), a full control of legality of facts and
law (e.g for fines) or a full-merits review (appeal process in the UK in some instances). This
oversight may set variable limits to the margin of appreciation of the competition authority or
the first instance judge, in particular as the reviewing court might take a different view over
the need to defer to the judgment of the decision-maker at first instance and to her perception
of what constitutes an appropriate or proportional remedy. The judicial oversight is even
stronger in the presence of a specialised tribunal, as opposed to a non-specialised court, as it
has been acknowledged by the Court of appeal in the UK. An important relevant issue to
determine is if there is a dichotomy between specialised and non-specialised courts or if this
is a continuum. The grounds of review may also affect the degree of remedial discretion.
Remedial action which is subject to a simple rationality means-end test faces fewer
constraints to the choice of appropriate remedies than one subject to a proportionality test,
and even more, to a cost-benefit analysis test.
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The remedial discretion of the decision-maker is of course stronger for prophylactic
remedies than for other types of remedies. But even in this case, it remains limited.
Competition law remedies cannot be transformed to regulatory remedies. The different
institutional context is one side of the story. Competition authorities and courts are unable to
administer far reaching prophylactic remedies that would require continuous monitoring and
supervision of entire economic sectors. The information they can hear in litigation (evidence)
is limited by the nature of the dispute and by the very specific scope of the competition law
wrong they aim to address. This does not cover all types of market failure, but those
emanating from a restriction of competition. However, as it has been rightly noted by Pablo
Ibañez Colomo, there is a fine line between competition and regulation: First, competition
may become regulatory in nature ‘when its application on a proscriptive basis (rather than
prescriptive basis) would not be possible given the features of the relevant market’272;
Second, the ‘expected standards of intervention in a competition law case can be defined as
the composite of (i) the gravity of the infringement identified and (ii) the remedies (if any)
required to bring an end to it’, the relationship between the two being presumed to be a
‘linear one, i.e. the intrusiveness of a given remedy increases in direct proportion with the
gravity of the infringement’273. The author continues by explaining that ‘(w)here competition
law is instrumentalised, the remedies imposed in a given case may exceed what would be
necessary to bring an end to the infringement identified by the authority’274, thus implicitly
elevating the relation between remedies and rights/wrongs as the defining boundary between
competition law remedies and regulatory remedies. The two ‘do not follow the same logic’,
as the former are generally concerned ‘with preserving the existing market structure from
being further deteriorated, and not with sharing (or neutralising competitive advantages)’275.
The disproportional character of competition law remedies imposed by the
Commission when they aim to challenge the prevailing market structure seems also to
amount, according to the same author, to transforming them to regulatory remedies276. If we
follow this approach, competition authorities should abstain from imposing remedies that
look like regulatory remedies. Regulatory remedies, defined as remedies that have no direct
relation or are disproportionate in relation to the wrong they aim to address, become the outer
boundary of remedial discretion in competition law.
In an economically-oriented competition law, this boundary is more easily described
than practised. Theories of consumer harm may not only relate to the structure of the supply
side but may also be generated by the specific characteristics of the demand side. Behavioural
economics may provide insights on how some behavioural biases of consumers may be
272 Ibañez Colomo, P. (2010) ‘On the Application of Competition Law as Regulation: Elements for a Theory’
Yearbook of European Law 29(1) 261-306, p. 264.
273 Ibid., p. 277.
274 Ibid., p. 279.
275 Ibid., p. 283.
276 Ibid., pp. 290-292.
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exploited by incumbents in order to raise prices. If the practices of the incumbents are caught
by competition law, the remedy will need to address these behavioural biases in order to be
effective. Yet, providing for remedies dealing with existing behavioural biases will not just
restore the competitive process, but will generate a very different one than the one prior to the
identified ‘competition law’ infringement. Would that remedy be considered as having a
regulatory nature and hence being outside the normal scope of competition law remedies as it
aims to shape the conditions of competition in the market?
If one takes an efficiency-driven and deterrence-based approach, the ‘regulatory’ label
of the remedy should not be a matter of concern. After all, the remedy is optimal as it
improves the market equilibrium compared to that prior to the infringement. However, from a
corrective justice/private law or a proportionality/public law perspective, such remedy would
challenge the proper boundaries of remedial discretion. The tension of this type of remedy
with the correlativity principle of the corrective justice/private law account of remedies is
obvious, as the remedy will aim more than to restore the situation of the parties prior to the
infringement. One could object that the polycentric dimension of the public law account of
remedies might better accommodate ‘regulatory remedies’. And this is certainly true in the
context of a pure regulatory law dispute.
Yet, it is our contention that competition law disputes should be different and their
polycentric character much more limited than pure regulatory law disputes. First, competition
law remedies277 relate to the exercise of an adjudicative function, either of a competition
authority or of a court, and thus should be distinguished from remedies adopted in the context
of a rule-making activity, as it is often the case in regulation. Second, even when regulators
exercise an adjudicative function in enforcing regulation, the polycentric nature of the
regulatory dispute is more pronounced than in the context of competition law, the decision
taking explicitly into account the economic conditions of an entire sector of activities, rather
than the competitive conditions of a specific relevant market on which are active the parties
to the dispute, by definition a narrower exercise. Third, the interests that are usually
considered in a regulatory dispute are in principle more diverse than those taken into account
in competition law disputes, the regulators assuming various responsibilities, such as the
protection of the environment, universal service, security of supply etc, while competition
authorities’ role is primarily confined to the protection of the competitive process. As a result
of the variety of regulatory goals, there is more extensive participation in the decision-making
process of actors representing diverse interests, not directly related to the dispute.
277 With the notable exception of remedies imposed in the context of market investigation references in the UK,
following Part 5 of the Enterprise Act 2002. In the EU context, sector inquiries do not carry the possibility for
the Commission to impose remedies, but may instead lead to the initiation of competition law proceedings under
Articles 101 and 102 TFEU. Consequently, the mandate of the Commission in exercising its competition law
competence is exclusively adjudicatory.
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Focusing, for illustration purposes, on merger control, which is the closer a
competition law procedurecan cometo a regulatory law one, the implementing regulation
provides for the participation in the process of ‘third parties’, a category which is narrowly
defined as including those having a ‘sufficient interest’ in the Commission’s procedure, such
as customers, suppliers, competitors, members of the administration or management organs
of the undertakings concerned or recognised workers’ representatives of those
undertakings278. Certainly, the Commission has appointed a Consumer Liaison officer and
might also invite the views of other interested third parties including consumer
organisations279, but these parties do not have a right to be heard in the absence of an explicit
invitation by the Commission. In any case, the third parties are expected to comment only on
the competition implications of the merger, rather than on broader issues, such as the
protection of employment, environment etc280. This contrasts with the wide participation of
various interests in the context of regulatory decision-making, often with the involvement of
intermediary, although not elected, bodies representing a supposed public interest, and less
frequently, by direct intervention from interested publics. Consequently, despite the
polycentric dimension of most competition law decisions281, remedies are precisely confined
to address the specific situation under adjudication. Indeed, the boundaries of remedial
discretion are delimited by the interplay of the specific goals entrusted to competition
authorities, the principle of remedial proportionality and the control of legality for misuse of
powers282.
IV. Voluntary versus coercive remedies: a false dichotomy?
A. The distinction between voluntary and coercive remedies
As it was previously explained, in merger control, remedies take the form of commitments
offered by the parties to the merger, either at Phase I or Phase II of the merger procedure,
which are eventually accepted by the Commission if they address its ‘serious doubts’ over the
legality of the merger or the ‘competition concerns’ identified. This leads to the publication
of a decision under Article 6(2) or 8(2) of the EC Merger Control Regulation, which makes
binding the commitments offered by the parties. In the context of the ex post competition law
enforcement of Articles 101 and 102 TFEU, Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 enables the
278 On the role of third parties, see Article 18(4) of Merger Regulation 139/2004, op. cit. and Articles 16(1) and
(2) of the Implementing Regulation, op. cit..
279 Article 16(3) of the Implementing Regulation, op. cit.
280 See, DG Competition, Best Practices on the conduct of EC merger control proceedings, para. 37, referring
only to ‘competition concerns’.
281 Which do not only affect the parties to the dispute but also other competitors, consumers, customers,
shareholders, employees
282 This ground of judicial review refers to cases where an authority uses its powers to take a measure with a
purpose other than that for which the powers in question were conferred to it.
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Commission to make commitments offered by parties to its proceedings binding on them,
instead of issuing a regular prohibition decision, when those commitments address the
concerns expressed in the Commission’s preliminary assessment. Such a decision may be
adopted for a specified period and ‘shall’ conclude that there are no longer ‘grounds for
action’ by the Commission. Technically, commitment decisions offered under Article 9 of
Regulation 1/2003 are not remedies as they do not aim to put the infringement to an end, as it
is the case for Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 and phase II merger control decisions and do
not make any finding whether there has been an infringement283. Their only legal effect is to
close the Commission’s proceedings. Essentially, it is a measure of procedural economy284.
In addition, as it was noted by an Advocate General of the CJEU, ‘unlike Article 7,
Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 is not an instrument for establishing infringements of
competition law, but merely gives the Commission the possibility of effectively addressing
concerns over competition for the future’285. Contrary to Article 7 infringement decisions,
they cannot be used as conclusive evidence of the existence of an infringement of EU
competition rules in follow on private actions for damages286. Yet, from a functional
perspective they can be qualified as ‘remedies’, as they aim to redress the situation of the
victims of the competition law violation to that prior to the infringement.
As both Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 commitment decisions and decisions adopted
in the context of merger control are formally suggested by the parties to the transaction, they
can be opposed to other competition law remedies and sanctions, which are imposed
unilaterally by the Commission and are not the product of a ‘voluntary’ agreement between
the Commission and the parties to the dispute (coercive remedies)287. In a similar vein,
commentators, and most recently the CJEU, consider that commitment decisions form part of
what has been characterised as a ‘consensual competition law enforcement’ or a culture of
‘settlement’, thus accentuating the opposition between the voluntary nature of commitment
decisions and the coercive nature of Article 7 of Regulation 1/2003 decisions imposing
injunctions to the parties288.
283 Temple Lang, John (2009) ‘Commitment Decisions under Regulation 1/2003’,  in C. Gheur & N. Petit
(Eds.), Alternative Enforcement Techniques in EC Competition Law Emile Bruylant.Pp. 121-144, p. 122.
284 Case C-441/07, Commission v. Alrosa, op. cit., para. 35.
285 Opinion of Advocate General J. Kokott, Case C-441/07, Commission v. Alrosa, op. cit., para. 50.
286 Cengiz, Firat (2011) ‘Judicial Review and the Rule of Law in the EU Competition law Regime After Alrosa’,
European Competition Journal 7 (1) 127-153, P. 130.
287 Opinion of Advocate General J. Kokott, Case C-441/07, op. cit., paras 51 & 55, noting the ‘voluntary’
character of the commitments; Wagner von Papp, F. (2012). ‘Best and Even Better Practices in Commitment
Procedures After Alrosa: The Dangers of Abandoning the ‘Struggle for Competition Law’’ (hereinafter, ‘Best
and Even Better Practices’), Common Market Law Review 49 (3) 929-970, Pp. 932-933. Noting the ‘hybrid
character of commitment decisions’, opposing the ‘public law paradigm’ of ‘an authoritative, unilateral top-
down hierarchical command by the State’ to the ‘contract law paradigm’ which relies on voluntary negotiations
between the parties.
288 See, Case C-441/07, op. cit., para. 48 (noting that undertakings ‘consciously’ accept concessions in the
context of a commitment procedure under Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003). For a discussion see, inter alia,
Waelbroeck, D. (2009) ‘The Development of a New ‘Settlement Culture’ in Competition Cases’, in C. Gheur &
N. Petit (Eds.) Alternative Enforcement Techniques in EC Competition Law. Emile Bruylant.  Pp. 221-260; C.D.
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1. The implications of the distinction on the remedial discretion of competition
authorities
The EU Courts have relied on the classification of remedies as voluntary or coercive, when
dealing with the question of the degree of the remedial discretion competition authorities
benefit from in EU antitrust and merger proceedings. Competition authorities are subject to
restrictions in the use of voluntary remedies, at least in antitrust proceedings. Recital 13 of
Regulation 1/2003 warns that commitment decisions under Article 9 may not be appropriate
in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine. Hardcore cartel cases, generally
subject to fines, cannot be closed by a commitment decision289. The principle of
proportionality may also limit the remedial discretion of competition authorities in both
merger and antitrust proceedings.
We have already commented above on the application of the proportionality principle
in merger decisions accepting commitments. Although Article 9, unlike Article 7 of
Regulation No 1/2003, does not explicitly refer to proportionality, as a general principle of
EU law, proportionality is none the less a criterion for the lawfulness of any act of the
institutions of the Union, including ‘voluntary’ remedies accepted  by the Commission290.
Yet, the precise extent and limits of the obligations which flow from the observance of that
principle vary, according to the nature, voluntary or coercive, of the proceedings.
In Alrosa, the General Court applied the principle of proportionality to an Article 9 of
Regulation 1/2003 commitment decision. Alrosa and De Beers, respectively the first and
second most important companies active in the production and supply of rough diamonds,
with activities in vertically related markets, had entered into an agreement according to which
Alrosa undertook to sell De Beers natural rough diamonds to the value of USD 800 million a
year for a specific period of time, while De Beers undertook to buy those diamonds from
Alrosa. The amount of rough diamonds concerned by the agreement represented around one
half of Alrosa’s annual production and its entire production exported outside the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), where Alrosa was based. The Commission sent
two statements of objection: one to both companies alleging an infringement of Article 101
TFEU, and another one to De Beers with regard to an infringement of Article 102 TFEU. In
response to the Commission’s concerns under Article 101 TFEU, the parties offered ‘joint
commitments’ suggesting to reduce significantly the amount of diamonds delivered by Alrosa
Ehlermann & M. Marquis (Eds.) (2010) European Competition Law Annual 2008: Antitrust Settlements under
EC Competition Law. Oxford: Hart Publishing Press. (; Wagner von Papp, F. (2012) ‘Best and Even Better
Practices’, op. cit., p. 929.
289 See, however, the possibility for settlements in cartel cases: Commission Regulation (EC) No 622/2008
amending Regulation (EC) No 773/2004, as regards the conduct of settlement procedures in cartel cases, [2008]
OJ L 171/3.
290 Case C-441/07, op. cit., para. 36.
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to De Beers by 2010, thus enabling competing firms to enter the market. Alrosa had
previously offered commitments with an undertaking not to sell diamonds to De Beers with
effect from 2013, but subsequently withdrew them. Following a market-test and the
expression of concerns from third parties, the Commission invited both companies to suggest
revised joint commitments that would phase out Alrosa’s sales with the view to stop De
Beers purchases by 2009. De Beers offered unilateral commitments designed to meet the
concerns expressed and the Commission accepted the unilateral commitments and made them
binding by issuing an Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 decision. The decision depriving Alrosa
from its main customer, the company brought an action for annulment of the Commission’s
decision at the General Court on different grounds, including the violation of the principle of
proportionality.
The General Court ignored the consensual character of the commitment decision
explaining that ‘the voluntary nature of the commitments […] does not relieve the
Commission of the need to comply with the principle of proportionality, because it is the
Commission’s decision which makes those commitments binding’ and that ‘giving that
commitment, the undertakings concerned merely assented, for their own reasons, to a
decision which the Commission was empowered to adopt unilaterally.’291 The Court found
that the nature and extent of the obligations generated by commitment decisions were
equivalent to those emanating from an Article 7 remedy, thus accepting that the principle of
proportionality applied in the same way to voluntary and coercive remedies. In order to fulfil
its duty under the principle of proportionality in the context of Article 9, the Commission was
invited to perform ‘an appraisal in concreto of the viability of the intermediate solutions’,
suggested by the parties but not finally chosen, in order to identify the least restrictive (to the
rights of the infringing undertaking) alternative.292 The Court also held that
‘compliance with the principle of proportionality requires that, when measures that
are less onerous than those it proposes to make binding exist, and are known by it, the
Commission should examine whether those measures are capable of addressing the
concerns which justify its action before it adopts, in the event of their proving
unsuitable, the more onerous approach’.293
The Court noted that the Commission cannot prohibit ‘absolutely any future trading
relations between two undertakings unless such a decision is necessary to re-establish the
situation which existed prior to the infringement’294. In this case the Commission had rejected
291 Case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission [2007] ECR II-2601, paras. 105–6; Appeal Case C-441/07 P.
292 Id. at para. 156. See, however, the contrary position of Advocate General Kokkott in Case C-441/07 P,
Commission v. Alrosa, para. 62.
293 Case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission, para. 131.
294 Id. at para. 103. Emphasis added.
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the joint commitments offered by Alrosa and de Beers fearing that the exclusive supply
commitment laid down in the agreement signed between Alrosa and De Beers would result in
strengthening De Beers’ market position. The Commission found that imposing this
termination to the contractual relation between the two parties was clearly necessary in order
to allow third parties to have access to Alrosa’s output and to allow Alrosa to compete fully
with De Beers. The main concern was that De Beers benefited from an advantage over its
competitors, not only because of its size but also because it was able to guarantee the best
consistency in the supply of rough diamonds to its customers.
It was not, however, clear how the remedy responded to the competition concern
raised. First, the Commission had not explained how continuing supply to De Beers would
affect Alrosa’s ability to guarantee a regular supply of significant quantities of rough
diamonds. Second, even if this had been the case, and the continuation of supply would have
increased the competitive advantage of De Beers, thus contributing to maintain or reinforce
its dominant position on the market, this does not constitute an abuse of a dominant position.
As it was put clearly by the Court:
‘[s]ince the object of Article [102 TFEU] is not to prohibit the holding of dominant
positions but solely to put an end to their abuse, the Commission cannot require an
undertaking in a dominant position to refrain from making purchases which allow it to
maintain or to strengthen its position on the market, if that undertaking does not, in so
doing, resort to methods which are incompatible with the competition rules. While
special responsibilities are incumbent on an undertaking which occupies such a
position, they cannot amount to a requirement that the very existence of the dominant
position be called into question’.295
The Court of Justice of the EU struck nevertheless down the judgment of the General
Court for having applied to a similar extent the proportionality control in Article 9 and
Article 7 decisions.296 The Court of Justice noted that ‘the obligation on the Commission to
ensure that the principle of proportionality is observed has a different extent and content,
depending on whether it is considered in relation to the former or the latter article.’297 It
further explained that
‘application of the principle of proportionality by the Commission in the context of
Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003 is confined to verifying that the commitments in
question address the concerns it expressed to the undertakings concerned and that they
295 Id. at para. 146.
296 Case C-441/07, European Commission v. Alrosa Company Ltd. [2010] ECR I-5949.
297 Id. at paras. 38, 48 (noting the specific characteristics of the mechanisms provided for in Articles 7 and 9 of
Regulation 1/2003 and the voluntary character of the commitments under Article 9).
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have not offered less onerous commitments that also address those concerns
adequately’298.
Although both Article 7 and 9 decisions are subject to the principle of proportionality, the
application of that principle differs according to which of those provisions is concerned.
Hence, according to the Court of Justice,
‘(t)here is therefore no reason why the measure which could possibly be imposed in
the context of Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003 should have to serve as a reference
for the purpose of assessing the extent of the commitments accepted under Article 9 of
the regulation, or why anything going beyond that measure should automatically be
regarded as disproportionate […].
Undertakings which offer commitments on the basis of Article 9 of Regulation
No 1/2003 consciously accept that the concessions they make may go beyond what
the Commission could itself impose on them in a decision adopted under Article 7 of
the regulation after a thorough examination’299.
2. The implications of Alrosa on the remedial discretion of the Commission
Following Alrosa, the distinction between voluntary and unilateral remedies leads to a
different application of the proportionality principle, hence to a different interaction between
the remedy step and that of establishing the existence of a competition law wrong, but also to
a greater variation in the degree of judicial scrutiny of remedies and the remedial discretion
of the Commission.
(a) A different application of the proportionality test
Exploring subsequently the implications of the distinction, it should be noted, first,
that for Article 9 Regulation 1/2003 commitment decisions, the proportionality ground of
review is transformed to some reinforced control of the rationality (means-end test) of the
remedy, even if the Court still keeps the proportionality label. Yet, the third step of the
proportionality test, the assessment of the existence of a least restrictive alternative, finds
itself significantly emptied from its content. The Court refers vaguely to it, noting that in the
context of Article 9 decisions, the Commission ‘is confined to verifying that the
commitments in question address the concerns it expressed to the undertakings concerned and
that they have not offered less onerous commitments that also address those concerns
298 Ibid., para. 41.
299 Ibid., para. 48-49. Emphasis added.
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adequately’300. Advocate General Kokott explains in her Opinion the operation of the
proportionality control in this context:
‘(t)he Commission is not required, in relation to decisions under Article 9 of
Regulation No 1/2003, itself to seek less onerous alternatives to the commitments
offered to it. Nevertheless, it must review all the alternatives to the commitments – in
this case in particular the joint commitments by De Beers and Alrosa – known to it in
order to ascertain whether they constitute less onerous means of resolving the
competition problems identified, by which interests of third parties are not affected or
are affected less severely.
However, in this connection the Commission is required to take into consideration
only alternatives which are equally appropriate as the commitments offered to it with
a view to resolving the competition problems identified. Both the commitments
actually offered and any alternatives to those commitments must therefore be
manifestly appropriate for resolving the competition problems. […]
In accordance with the spirit and purpose of Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, the
assessment of alternatives is not intended to require any extensive and lengthy
investigations or evaluations. In proceedings under Article 9 the Commission need
not take into consideration alternatives whose appropriateness could not be
established with sufficient certainty without such efforts’301.
The implications of this transformation of the proportionality test on the tactics of the
parties to the transaction have been explored elsewhere302. We will focus here on the type of
analysis required by the Commission in the context of the third step of the proportionality test
for Article 9 commitment decisions.
First, the Commission can only explore the least restrictive character of the
commitments in comparison to commitments already received and known to it, and not in
comparison to alternative remedies that could have addressed, in the Commission’s view, the
competition law wrong identified. This limits considerably the scope of the third step of the
proportionality analysis as commitments are only offered by the parties concerned, which are
induced, as we will explore later, to offer commitments that go beyond the redress of the
competition wrong identified. Of course the problem may be avoided if the parties decide to
300 Case C-441/07 P, op. cit., para. 41.
301 Opinion of Advocate General J. Kokott, Case C-441/07 P, op. cit., paras 56-58
302 For an excellent analysis see, Wagner von Papp, F. (2012) ‘Best and Even Better Practices’, op. cit., pp. 936-
939, noting that the case law of the Court is an open invitation to the parties to engage in ‘salami tactics’, that is
the presentation to the Commission of a selection of alternative incremental commitments, thus imposing to it
the comparative proportionality analysis of all options that was demanded by the General Court in Alrosa.
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adopt the tactic of suggesting alternative incremental commitments, but should they decide to
do so, they will incur the risk of ‘increasing the Commission’s decision space instead of
restricting it’303. The views of parties concerned are not also represented in the choice of the
appropriate remedy. The configuration of the Alrosa case was atypical, as Alrosa was not a
third party, having also been targeted by the Commission in its investigation and been led to
offer joint commitments to it.
Second, even if the parties propose alternative remedies, the Commission is not
required to perform any extensive and lengthy investigations or evaluations of the different
remedies suggested but to limit its analysis on the identification of a remedy that is
‘manifestly appropriate’ for resolving the competition problems. The terminology employed
does not seem to describe an exacting and careful exercise of the comparative costs and
benefits to the parties’ rights of the alternative remedies suggested.
Finally, the ‘proportionality’ analysis is partly biased in favour of the option chosen
by the Commission, because of the weight put on the procedural economy benefits offered by
commitment decisions. It is explained that ‘it is perfectly conceivable for the Commission to
dismiss certain solutions in the context of Article 9 which it would have had to investigate in
the context of Article 7 of Regulation No. 1/2003’304 and that ‘(t)he general interest in finding
an optimum solution from the point of view of speed and procedural economy justifies
restricting the choice of possible measures in the context of Article 9 of Regulation
1/2003’305. The benefits of commitment decisions for the undertakings concerned are
overstated306, and third parties are offered a more limited protection than in the context of
Article 7 infringement decisions307. As a result of this weighted ‘proportionality’ analysis, the
mismatch between the remedy and the competition law wrong risks to be more pronounced in
the context of Article 9 commitment decisions than in Article 7 Regulation 1/2003 decisions,
or also merger decisions. As it is noted by the Court,
‘(t)here is […] no reason why the measure which could possibly be imposed in the
context of Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003 should have to serve as a reference for
the purpose of assessing the extent of the commitments accepted under Article 9 of
the regulation, or why anything going beyond that measure should automatically be
regarded as disproportionate. Even though decisions adopted under each of those
provisions are in either case subject to the principle of proportionality, the application
303 Ibid., pp. 937-938.
304 Opinion of Advocate General J. Kokott, op. cit., para. 59.
305 Ibid., para. 60.
306 Ibid., para. 60, noting that ‘(i)n return, with the termination of the antitrust proceedings initiated against
them, they are quickly given legal certainty and can avoid the finding of an infringement of competition rules
which would be detrimental to them and possibly an impending fine’.
307 Ibid., para. 61, noting that reliance by third parties on the existence of a practice allegedly anticompetitive
deserves at most ‘limited protection’, having regard to the general interest in undistorted competition’.
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of that principle none the less differs according to which of those provisions is
concerned.
Undertakings which offer commitments on the basis of Article 9 of Regulation
No 1/2003 consciously accept that the concessions they make may go beyond what
the Commission could itself impose on them in a decision adopted under Article 7 of
the regulation after a thorough examination’.308.
The limited degree of judicial scrutiny the Court is inclined to perform on Article 9
commitment decisions exemplifies this problem.
(b) A limited degree of judicial scrutiny for commitment decisions
In Alrosa, the Court held that judicial review for Article 9 decisions ‘relates solely to whether
the Commission’s assessment is manifestly incorrect’309. The interplay of this weak form of
judicial scrutiny with the specific interpretation of the proportionality principle in the context
of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003, which we explored below, offers a wide remedial
discretion to the Commission. As it explained by the Court, ‘(t)he General Court could have
held that the Commission had committed a manifest error of assessment only if it had found
that the Commission’s conclusion was obviously unfounded, having regard to the facts
established by it’310.
The terminology employed by the Court, ‘obviously unfounded’, resembles to the
control of rationality in Wednesdbury unreasonableness, in the context of UK public law for
public wrongs, a lower standard of judicial scrutiny offering a wide margin of appreciation to
the authority. A similar standard of review applies also to remedial decisions in the context of
UK competition law, despite the more active intervention of the judiciary in an appeals
process, which shows that there is a perception that the intensity of judicial review in this
context should be relatively limited. This contrasts with the more intensive review of
remedies in merger control, although the voluntary nature of the merger remedies leads to a
similar understanding with Article 9 decisions with regard to the operation of the
proportionality test311. There is wide agreement that the intensity of judicial review in EU
merger control has increased considerably in recent times312. In Tetra Laval BV, Advocate
308 Case C-441/07 P, op. cit., paras 47-48.
309 Ibid., para. 42.
310 Ibid., para. 63. Emphasis added.
311 See, Case T-282/02, Cementbouw, op. cit., paras 308, 314-319; Case C-202/06, Cementbouw and the opinion
of Advocate General Kokott in this case as well.
312 See, for instance, Parr, Nigel (2008) ‘Observations on burden and standard of proof and judicial review in EC
and UK merger control’, in Annual proceedings of the Fordham Corporate Law Institute Fordham University
Press. P. 155-182 ; Fountoukakos, Kyriakos (2008) ‘Judicial Review and EC Merger Control: Reflections on the
Effectiveness of the System with Regard to the Standard of Review and Speed’ Cambridge yearbook of
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General Tizzano noted that judicial review of the finding of facts ‘is clearly more intense, in
that the issue is to verify objectively and materially the accuracy of certain facts and the
correctness of the conclusions drawn in order to establish whether certain known facts make
it possible to prove the existence of other facts to be ascertained’313. This seems a higher
intensity of review than the examination by the Court of the ‘obviously unfounded’ character
of the conclusions of the Commission with regard to the factual basis of remedies in Article 9
commitment decisions.
This is also true with regard to the lower intensity of judicial scrutiny exercised on the
Commission’s complex economic appreciations in merger control, where the Court has to
respect ‘the broad discretion inherent in that kind of assessment’314. Yet, as it is also
explained in the Opinion of Advocate General Tizzano,
‘the fact that the Commission enjoys broad discretion in assessing whether or not a
concentration is compatible with the common market does certainly not mean that it
does not have in any case to base its conviction on solid elements gathered in the
course of a thorough and painstaking investigation or that it is not required to give a
full statement of reasons for its decision, disclosing the various passages of logical
argument supporting the decision. The Commission […] is bound to examine the
relevant market carefully; to base its assessment on elements which reflect the facts as
they really are, which are not plainly insignificant and which support the conclusions
drawn from them, and on adequate reasoning; and to take into consideration all
relevant factors’315.
The analysis goes far beyond looking to the ‘obviously unfounded’ character of the
Commission’s conclusions in Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 cases and delves into its
decision’s ‘logic, coherence and appropriateness’316.
In conclusion, EU competition law operates with varying intensities of review, thus
embodying a sliding scale, which goes from a more intensive judicial scrutiny of Article 7
decisions, then an intermediary intensity of review for merger decisions and finally a lower
intensity of review for Article 9 decisions. The voluntary character of commitment decisions
does not explain this difference of degree in the intensity of judicial review, as otherwise the
level of scrutiny would have been equivalent to that of merger control decisions. Yet, the
judicial scrutiny for commitment decisions is of a lower degree than in merger control. The
European Legal Studies. Pp. 133-166. On the national context, see Michael Harker, Sebastian Peyer & Kathryn
Wright (2011) ‘Judicial Scrutiny of Merger Decisions in the EU, UK and Germany’, International and
Comaprative Law Quaterly 60 (1) Pp. 93-124.
313 Opnion of Advocate General Tizzano, Case C-12/03 P, op. cit., para. 86.
314 Ibid.
315 Ibid., para. 87. Emphasis added.
316 Ibid., para. 88.
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prospective nature of the prophylactic remedies adopted in the context of Article 9 may be
considered as an additional factor of differentiation317, although the Commission performs
complex economic assessments involving prospective analysis in the context of merger
control but also for Article 7 decisions318. Hence, if there is any difference between antitrust
commitments decisions, from one side, and merger phase II decisions and antitrust
injunctions, from the other side, this should relate to the fact that these individual decisions
pursue different objectives, the first aiming to address the Commission’s concerns following
a preliminary assessment, while the second aiming to put an end to the infringement that has
been found to exist319. However, an alternative approach to the variance of the intensity of
judicial review would be to integrate the requirements of procedural economy in the
proportionality test, the same way as requirements of effectiveness of the remedy have been
added to the cost benefit analysis of remedies in UK competition law. In any case, the sliding
scale of judicial review shows that the remedial discretion of the Commission remains
important in the area of commitment decisions and that there is a risk of misfit between the
remedies and the competition wrong they aim to address, possibly leading to broad
prophylactic remedies of regulatory nature320.
B. Criticism to the voluntary/coercive remedies dichotomy
We have explained in the previous section how the opposition introduced by the case law of
the Court between voluntary and coercive remedies does not justify the different implications
following from the adoption of such remedies for the control of proportionality and the
intensity of judicial review. In this section, we will argue that the distinction is also wrong
and does not take sufficiently into account the important similarities between injunctions and
commitments in EU competition law. The opposition often made between a ‘contract law
paradigm’, and a ‘public law’ one, as the theoretical framework of the distinction, does not
stand serious scrutiny. First, the reference to the ‘public law paradigm’ as a separate pole to
the ‘contract law’ one, seems far-fetched in view of the importance of ‘administrative
contracts’ in continental administrative law, but also of the distinction between imperium
merum (the power to coerce) and jurisdictio (the power to make legal decisions)321. Remedies
do not form part of the imperium but of the mixtum imperium, the power which a magistrate
has for the purposes of administering the civil (not criminal) part of the law, which is incident
317 As this is noted by Advocate General Kokott in Case C-441/07, op. cit., para 71.
318 See, for instance, the complex economic assessments involving prospective analysis completed for choosing
an appropriate remedy in the Microsoft case.
319 Case C-441/07, op. cit., para. 46. If this is, however, the distinguishing criterion, then remedies suggested in
phase I (article 6(2) should not be subject to the more demanding judicial scrutiny of merger control, as no
finding of infringement has been made, only serious doubts about its existence, but subject to the less intensive
judicial review of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 commitment decisions.
320 See, for instance, the commitment decisions adopted in
321 Gerasimos, Alex. ‘Sofianatos, Injonctions et Engagements en Droit de la Concurrence’, op. cit., pp. 3-5.
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to jurisdictio. If remedies were classified within the imperium it would not have been
possible, first, for arbitration clauses to be included in merger remedies, arbitration being in
this case a forced ‘contract’, which is a distinct possibility in EU merger control,322 and,
second, for remedial injunctions to produce extraterritorial effects323.
More troubling is the opposition sometimes made between the passive role of the
parties in Article 7 proceedings and their active role in commitment decisions, in merger
control or in the context of Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003. Despite the ‘coercive’ appearance
of an injunction, often this is the result of a prior (failed) negotiation between the
Commission and the parties concerned, the Commission attempting at least to achieve some
form of adhesion from the parties that will guarantee the proper execution of the remedy324.
The psychological pressure that an infringement decision might be adopted by the
Commission, in the absence of commitments offered by the parties, largely denies the
voluntary and consensual nature of the process and enables the Commission to extract
disproportionate remedies.
Some commentators have criticized the conclusion that the Commission may extract
disproportionate remedies, arguing that the ‘extra price’ paid by a risk averse party to avoid
an infringement decision does not make by itself the commitments disproportional. The
assumption is that ‘the commitments offered are presumably at most equal in value to (1) the
expected value of the remedies imposed in an infringement decision- if necessary, discounted
to net present value -, plus (2) the avoided expected discounted costs associated with the
further investigations (and possibly litigation), this sum being multiplied by (3) the risk
aversion factor that reflects the actor’s preference for the certain outcome in the commitment
procedure as compared to the variance of sanctions possible in an infringement decision’325.
According to these authors, such an approach implicitly compares the infringement
sanctions from one side with the commitments including the risk aversion factor and the
added investigation/litigation costs, on the other side, a counterfactual which they criticize as
being the ‘wrong’ one326. They argue that, assuming that the Commission imposes sanctions
in the infringement procedure (and that they are proportional), the undertakings would still
suffer the additional costs incurred by further investigations and probably judicial review as
well as ‘the costs reflected by the risk aversion factor because of the undertakings’ continued
322 Liebscher, Ch. (2004) ‘Drafting Arbitration Clauses for EC Merger Control’, Journal of International
Arbitration 21(1) 67; Blanke, G. (2006) ‘International Abritration in EC Merger Control: A Supranational
Lesson to be Learned’, European Competition Law Review 27(6) 324; Idot, L. (2000) ‘Une innovation
surprenante: L’Introduction de l’arbitrage dans le contrôle communautaire des concentrations’, Revue
d’arbitrage 4, 591.
323 Sofianatos, G.A., Injonctions et Engagements en Droit de la Concurrence’, op. cit., p. 486. However, that
does not guarantee the execution of the remedial injunctions outside the EU.
324 Ibid., pp. 188-191.
325 Wagner von Papp, F. (2012) ‘Best and Even Better Practices’, op. cit., p. 944.
326 See, for instance, Wagner von Papp, F. (2012) ‘Best and Even Better Practices’, op. cit., p. 944.
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uncertainty of the eventual outcome’327. Although these ‘friction costs’ are less visible in the
infringement procedure where they are dissipated, they become a visible part of the
commitments, without that however changing the overall burden on the undertakings. Hence,
according to them,
‘(there is) […] no reason why a proportionality test should take into account the
avoided costs of investigation/litigation and the concomitant uncertainty to the extent
they are transformed into commitments – and thus, hopefully, contribute some social
value -, but not to the extent they are dissipated as friction costs. In other words: if we
worry about risk aversion and the costs of the investigation and litigation in the
commitment procedure, then we would also have to take these factors into account
when deciding on the proportionality of sanctions imposed in the infringement
procedure. If we do not take them into account in the infringement procedure – and
we do not -, then there is no reason to raise concerns about them in the commitment
procedure’328.
This counterfactual compares the outcome in terms of the harshness or
disproportional (to the competition wrong) character of remedies if the parties offer
commitments with that in case the Commission proceeds in adopting an infringement
decision. However, the counterfactual offered by these authors does not take sufficiently into
account the other options offered to the Commission and the strategic interplay between the
Commission and the parties, in particular the possibility for the Commission to adopt a divide
and conquer strategy. Hence their conclusions may be subject to criticism. It is possible that
in the absence of a commitment from the parties, the Commission might decide not to bring
an infringement action and to abandon altogether the case. From that perspective, there is
always a risk that the commitments offered might be disproportional, as in this case the
parties do not incur any ‘friction costs’. More specifically, they do not incur
investigation/litigation costs. Because the option of an Article 7 infringement decision exists
for only a small fraction of defendants, commitments merely replace a no-prosecution option.
This is a distinct possibility for the following reasons. First, the Commission will not
accept a commitment decision for all cases, in particular hardcore restrictions, which are high
in its priority list, and for which they would prefer to impose sanctions, mainly for deterrence
reasons329. Hence, the cases leading to commitments are likely to be the ones for which the
nature of the infringement is not that egregious for competition law, as it is often the case
with cartels. Second, the counterfactual opposing two options (commitments or infringement
327 Ibid., p. 945.
328 Ibid., p. 945.
329 It is reminded that according to Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003, ‘Commitment decisions are not appropriate
in cases where the Commission intends to impose a fine’.
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decision) assumes that the Commission has infinite resources to carry out the investigations
and the analysis required for an infringement decision. It is also expected that the
Commission will also have adequate motivation and time for these long procedures.
However, in reality, the resources of the Commission are limited and DG Competition has to
make difficult enforcement choices. One could also add that the Commissioner for
competition (and the high officials at DG Competition) act within a specific time-limited
mandate. One of the main attractions of commitment decisions is that they bring results (in
terms of remedies) quickly without any significant costs in terms of human resources and
risks for the reputation of the Commission in case of a negative outcome at the judicial
review stage. It follows that the Commission does not have the incentive to prosecute all
anticompetitive practices that come to its knowledge. This prosecutorial resource constraint
undermines the assumption of these authors that, in the absence of commitments, the
defendants will face an Article 7 investigation and decision.
However, if the parties are aware that the Commission does not have the adequate
resources to prosecute all cases, why would they then be inclined to offer commitments
instead of taking the risk that the Commission abandons the case? In other words, the
prosecutorial resource constraint of the Commission should be factored in their strategy.
There are various reasons why knowledge of the Commission’s scarce resources will not
necessarily reduce the parties’ incentive to offer disproportional commitments. In a recent
paper on the ‘prisoners’ (plea bargain) dilemma’, Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar
examine the sources of the ‘credibility paradox’ to which leads this resource constraint,
asking,
‘[…] if the prosecutor has enough resources to take only a few defendants to trial,
how can her threats to take all defendants to trial induce them to plea? The resource
constraint, in other words, can potentially undermine the credibility of the
prosecutor’s threat. […] [W]hy do so many defendants accept harsh plea bargains if
the alternative for most of them is the non-prosecution option?’330.
They argue that because each defendant bargains individually with the Commission, the
defendants in general face a collective action problem, in the sense that if they refuse as a
group to offer harsh commitments to the Commission, they would all as a group be better off.
Assuming that each bargain struck with the Commission (a commitment decision) produces
externalities, as the defendant who proceeds with a commitment decision frees prosecutorial
resources to pursue other defendants, the Commission may use a divide and conquer strategy
in order to extract better terms from the agents than in the absence of these externalities331. At
330 Bar-Gill, Oren and Omri Ben-Shahar, (2009) ‘The Prisoners’ (Plea Bargain) Dilemma’, Journal of Legal
Analysis 1 (2) Pp. 737-773, p. 739.
331 Ibid., p. 743.
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the same time, the fact that, following the settlement, additional resources are available to
prosecute other cases increases the credibility of the Commission’s threat to ‘prosecute’ and
thus its bargaining power in the negotiation process with the parties offering commitments.
Hence, the collective action problem of the defendants enables the Commission or
other competition authorities to leverage their minimal resources into substantial bargaining
power, leading to commitments that generate one-sided outcomes rather than balanced
settlements, as one would have expected if commitments were analysed under the ‘contract
law’ paradigm332. The competition authorities may also enhance this bargaining power by
making public their objective function and defining their priorities. According to Oren Bar-
Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, ‘(a)s long as prosecutors are able to identify sequencing strategies
and other divide-and-conquer strategies and make it publicly known that they subscribe to
these orderings (by publishing a priority list), they will be able to bargain with each defendant
as if they have a credible threat to take this defendant to trial’333. They further note that ‘the
clarity of the priority list is a substitute for prosecutorial resources’ and that ‘for a severely
resource-constrained prosecutor, the solution is to make his priorities crystal clear’334.The
publication of guidance on the Commission’s enforcement priorities for exclusionary
abuses335 might operate as a tool to reinforce its ability, first, to secure a much higher number
of commitments than the number of Article 7 infringement investigations/decisions it could
have afforded to bring forward, in view of its focus on cartel activity, and second, extract
more burdensome (disproportional) remedies from the parties, than what would have been the
case in an Article 7 infringement decision336.
Florian Wagner von Papp notes some additional possibilities for the Commission to
use the infringement decision as leverage in the commitment procedure: Undertakings may
develop the belief that the Commission could ‘vary sanctions outside the proceeding at hand’,
thus treating undertakings in separate proceedings less favourably. The Commission may also
transform third parties’ claims into additional concessions from the undertakings, by
exploiting the incentive of the undertakings to offer commitments in order to avoid future
follow-on damages litigation337.
In conclusion, the alleged ‘voluntary’ and consensual nature of commitment decisions
represents more an effort of ex post rationalisation of the decision of the Court to limit
judicial review and the operation of the proportionality principle in the context of Article 9
commitment decisions, than serve as a solid foundation for justifying the different degrees of
332 Ibid., p. 741.
333 Ibid., p. 754.
334 Ibid., p. 756.
335 Communication from the Commission, Guidance on the Commission’s Enforcement Priorities in Applying
Article 82 EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant Undertakings [2009] OJ C 45/7.
336 The authors note that the Commission should bring some infringement actions against unyielding defendants
so as to keep the threat of the prosecution credible.
337 Wagner von Papp, F. (2012) ‘Best and Even Better Practices’, op. cit., p 947.
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discretionary remedialism in Article 7 and Article 9 of Regulation 1/2003 decisions as well as
in merger control decisions338.
V. Conclusion
The topic of competition law remedies has been left largely unexplored by legal and
economic literature. Although there is now substantial published work on antitrust sanctions
and antitrust damages, few studies have proceeded to undertake a systematic overall analysis
of all types of remedies, including conduct and structural remedies, in the areas of merger
control and antitrust. Even fewer have attempted to develop a theory of remedial action that
would explore the limits of remedial discretion in competition law. Many reasons may
explain this reticence of academic and professional literature to engage with the topic. First,
in the absence of a clear definition of the concept of remedy in EU competition law or, more
generally, in the law of various Member States of the EU, and of a well accepted taxonomy,
the study of remedies presents important challenges, as the contours of the concept have to be
determined before one proceeds to any empirical analysis. For this, it is important to unveil
the limits of remedial discretion in the context of the public and the private law accounts of
remedies, before applying them to competition law. Second, the optimal deterrence
(enforcement) model, the economic approach in determining appropriate remedies, which has
dominated so far competition law literature on remedies, does not accord well with the
principles of corrective justice and proportionality that animate respectively the private and
the public law accounts of remedies. To provide common ground, this study provides a novel
analytical framework integrating both economic and legal principles, taking the view that
although deterrence (and economic efficiency) constitutes an important objective of EU
Competition law, this should be achieved in the context of established legal understandings of
the concept of remedy. The fact that the concept is not well defined in law may offer the
opportunity needed for moving these understandings closer to an economic approach. More
specifically, we examined the impact of the economic approach on the linkage between the
competition law wrong and remedies as the foundations for an economically inspired but still
respectful to legal traditions concept of remedial discretion.
338 An indication of ex post rationalization is that the Court had arrived to a diametrically opposed conclusion as
to the ‘unilateral’ character of undertakings to which the parties have committed themselves (a decision adopted
under Article 3 of the old Regulation 17/62 and close to the commitment decisions under Article 9 of regulation
1/2003) , in Joined cases C-89/85, C-104/85, C-114/85, C-116/85, C-117/85 and C-125/85 to C-129/85, A.
Ahlström Osakeyhtiö and others v Commission [1993] ECR I-1307, paras 181-185.
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(Table 2)
)
Infringement
Excessive
pricing
Exclusive
dealing discrimination
Refusal to
supply/deal tying
Conditional
rebate
Abuse of
procedures
and
standards
Alteration
of market
structure
Predatory
behaviour
Abusive
contract
ual
clause Margin Squeeze
Remedy
fine (1=yes) 2 13 7 9 6 12 1 1 4 0 2
divestment 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
obligation to reorganise 0 2 0 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1
obligation to deal/supply 0 1 1 5 3 0 0 0 1 0 1
non discrimination 0 1 3 2 3 1 0 0 2 0 0
quantity/pricing obligation 0 2 1 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 1
obligation to
informcustomers 0 1 2 4 2 0 0 0 2 0 0
obligation to inform EC 0 1 3 2 2 1 0 0 3 0 0
obligation compliance
programme 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
IP/licensing/royalties
obligation 0 1 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 1 0
contractual obligation 0 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
Unbundling 0 0 0 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0
Observations 3 18 13 18 7 12 2 2 5 1 4
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